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The purpose of this study is to analyze and explain why two Inuit regions in Canada, Nunavik 
and Nunatsiavut, experienced different outcomes after extensive tripartite negotiations for self-
government. Although both regions appear to have similar basic features, the Nunavik self-
government agreement failed in a referendum in 2011, while the Nunatsiavut agreement was 
ratified six years earlier. I present a set of factors that have been known to influence outcomes 
in self-government negotiations. The factors I consider are the compatibility of government 
and Aboriginal group goals, minimal use of confrontational tactics, Aboriginal group cohesion 
and government perceptions of Aboriginal group. I also pay heed to institutional and contextual 
factors, such as the evolving institutional framework of Canada’s self-government policy and 
the emergence of multilevel governance structures in Inuit regions.  
In order to investigate this puzzle, I do a multiple case study and utilize the strategy of process 
tracing. Using semi-structured interviews, newspaper data, government reports, meeting 
minutes and scholarly literature I seek to identify the factors that might have contributed to 
Nunavik and Nunatsiavut’s different outcomes. The findings indicate that the divergent 
outcomes in the two cases best can be explained by the lack of group cohesion in Nunavik as 
compared to Nunatsiavut. In addition, I find that the layering of self-government policy and the 
emergence of a multilevel governance structure in Nunavik affected the self-government 
negotiation outcome in Nunavik negatively. In contrast to Nunatsiavut where there did not exist 
any multilevel governance structure, and which was positively impacted by the more extensive 
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1. Introduction  
On April 27 2011, the Inuit in Nunavik, Quebec turned to the ballots to decide whether to ratify 
the proposed self-government agreement with the Crown and the province of Quebec. After 
tripartite negotiations spanning over a period of two decades, numerous public consultations 
and four separate referendums, the process culminated with a decisive 66 percent victory for 
the 'no'-side. Six years prior, the Inuit in northern Labrador, just adjacent to Nunavik, voted on 
their own self-government plan, where 76 percent voted in favor of ratifying the agreement. 
That number would be even higher if you take in to account the fact that votes that were not 
cast counted as 'no' votes. The referendum came after nearly 20 years of negotiations.  
Since the end of World War II, indigenous peoples across the globe have increasingly 
participated in political activism. There is a high demand for the decolonization of relations 
between the settler states and the indigenous peoples, the "nations within". There is an 
Aboriginal call for reallocation of powers on the basis of collective rights. In Canada, the 
Indigenous peoples' drive towards self-governance started with a court case in British 
Columbia. It was in 1973 with the decision in Calder v. British Columbia where Canada 
recognized legal Aboriginal title to land. The decision prompted the federal government to 
develop new policy to address Aboriginal claims to land, and invite Aboriginal groups to file 
what it called comprehensive land claims (CLC). Under this process, Aboriginal groups that 
had never before completed a treaty could exchange undefined 'Aboriginal rights' for a "clearly 
defined package of rights and benefits set out in a land claim settlement agreement" (Hicks & 
White 2000, 94). The rights and benefits included in such a settlement would typically include 
"large amounts of land and money, jurisdiction over natural resources, fish and wildlife, 
migratory birds, taxation, economic development, and other far-reaching jurisdictions" 
(Alcantara 2013, 3).  
In the beginning of this process, self-government provisions were not a part of these 
agreements. It was not until Canada's Inherent Right of Self-Government Policy of 1995 that 
indigenous groups were able to include self-government arrangements in CLCs. Additionally, 
self-government became recognized as a fundamental right of Aboriginal peoples, and the 
Canadian government agreed to constitutionally protect particular aspects of self-government 
agreements as treaty rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. All of the CLCs 
completed after this policy was implemented have included self-government provisions 
(AANDC, 2016).  
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This is an important field of study, not only because self-government agreements have a 
significant impact on indigenous peoples’ lives, but also because it represents a positive change 
for Indigenous peoples in Canada and possibly elsewhere. Second, it is an important field of 
study as Aboriginal self-government, especially in the provincial North, represents a new phase 
in Canadian federalism, as it creates autonomous regions within existing federal units. In my 
thesis, I intend to study what factors can explain self-government negotiation outcomes, and 
more specific, what explains the divergent outcomes in the cases of the Inuit in Nunavik and 
Nunatsiavut.  
At first glance, Nunatsiavut and Nunavik share common traits that make their outcome 
variations puzzling. Firstly, the majority of the inhabitants in Nunavik and Nunatsiavut are 
Inuit, a population with one cultural and political tradition (Rodon and Grey 2008, 1). Secondly, 
Nunavik and Nunatsiavut are both located within provinces, as opposed to within territories. 
This means that their governance arrangements are the result of tripartite negotiations, in which 
the provinces have most of the jurisdiction. Thirdly, they were both negotiating for regional 
self-government and not a community-based self-government. Accordingly, Nunavik and 
Nunatsiavut’s shared similarities make their different outcomes even more puzzling. What 
explains their divergent outcomes, given their similar outset? 
Subsequently, the research question I intend to answer is the following: 
Why did Nunatsiavut succeed in attaining self-government following extensive tripartite 
negotiations while Nunavik did not, when they share similar basic features? 
1.1 Who are Indigenous peoples in Canada? 
Indigenous peoples, also referred to as Aboriginal peoples, have been in Canada since time 
immemorial. In 2011, more than 1.4 million people in Canada identified as Indigenous, 
representing 4,3 percent of the population. There are three categories of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada: the First Nations, Inuit and Metis. First Nations are predominant in Canada south of 
the Arctic, and there are currently 634 recognized First Nations governments or bands1 spread 
across Canada, roughly half of which are in the provinces of Ontario and British Columbia. 
They represent 60,8 percent of the total Aboriginal population. The Inuit primarily inhabit the 
                                                 
1 The basic unit of government for those peoples subject to the Indian Act, with membership ranging from below 
100 to over 20 000. 
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northern regions of Canada, in what is known as Inuit Nunangat2, which compromises 
approximately 35 percent of Canada’s land mass. The Inuit represent 4,2 percent of the total 
Aboriginal population and 0,2 percent of the total Canadian population. Metis peoples are of 
mixed European and Indigenous ancestry and mostly inhabit the Prairie Provinces3 and parts 
of Ontario. They represent 32,3 percent of the total Aboriginal population.  
The Indigenous peoples of Canada are found in all parts of the country. Aboriginal communities 
are located close to or in major cities (such as the Squamish First Nation in Vancouver)4 and in 
more remote northern communities. The Inuit, for example, inhabit large areas of land in the 
Arctic regions of Canada, and are very much isolated from the non-Aboriginal population of 
Canada.   
The territory of Canada was acquired mainly through the signing of historical treaties by the 
British and later the Canadian Crown with Indigenous peoples. The primary goal of those 
agreements was to acquire title to Indigenous lands in order to use and dispose to European 
settlers. In return for those lands, Aboriginal groups received much smaller parcel of lands, 
usually located in remote areas, money and supplies (Miller 2009). Much of Canada’s territory 
is covered by historical treaties, and believing that it had sufficient authority over all of 
Canada’s land, the government of Canada ceased signing treaties in 1921. Aboriginal groups 
that voluntarily entered into treaties with the Crown were harmed as a result of the treaties 
failing to match what they believed the agreements meant. They became impoverished and 
lacked a sufficient land base to carry out the political, economic and cultural activities that were 
vital for their way of life. Many Aboriginal groups signed treaties because of their poor 
circumstances, and wanted protection from encroachment and squatting. In sum, “Aboriginal 
groups entered into treaties to protect their way of life while government negotiators wanted 
Aboriginal lands for settlement and expansion” (Alcantara 2008, 44).  
Government policies towards Aboriginal peoples in Canada has traditionally been 
assimilationist in nature; the government has long tried to absorb Aboriginal groups into 
“mainstream” Canada and extinguish their cultural distinctiveness (Cairns 2000, 17). The 
Indian Act of 1876 was a compilation of the legislation the Canadian government had developed 
over the years to deal with First Nations and codified its relationship with Aboriginal people 
                                                 
2 Means “the place where Inuit live” and is comprised of four regions: Inuvialuit (NWT and Yukon), Nunavut, 
Nunavik (Northern Quebec and Nunatsiavut (Labrador). 
3 Comprise the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. 
4 There are 11 First Nations in the Metro Vancouver region alone. 
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(Miller 2009, 190). The Indian Act assigned ward-like status to First Nations, giving the 
government extensive control over many aspects of their lives and ensured that First Nations 
did not enjoy full citizenship rights, such as the right to own land and vote (Poelzer and Coates 
2015, 8). The Indian Act also defined who qualified as an “Indian” in the eyes of the 
government, distinguishing between status and non-status Indians, who did not enjoy 
Aboriginal rights5.  
The Indian Act led to the fracturing of the First Nation communities into many different 
reserves created by Canada, and required First Nations children to attend residential schools 
(Abele and Prince 2006, 371). Their ability to exercise traditional forms of government in 
keeping with their culture was also severely diminished, as they were replaced by band councils 
in keeping with the Indian Act (Morse 1999, 18). Abele and Prince (2006, 572) have noted that 
band councils have been referred to as “minus-municipalities” because they had less power and 
independence than the elected leaders of Canada’s cities and towns. Band councils exercised 
authority delegated to them from the federal government, but were closely monitored by the 
Department of Indian Affairs (ibid).  
Aboriginal groups have long been marginalized in the Canadian public through government 
policies meant to integrate them into Canadian society. Government intervention brought 
uneven benefits. Health care and life expectancy improved. However, there was little long-term 
economic development, and welfare dependency emerged as the core economic feature of 
Aboriginal communities. By the 1950s, reserve communities resembled ghettos and were 
typically separate from non-Aboriginal towns, while Metis and non-status settlements tended 
to be more poorly served than official reserves. Changes in the Indian policy came slowly, and 
it was not until 1960 that status Indians received the right to vote and the right to buy and drink 
alcohol.  
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s White Paper on Indian affairs of 1969 called for the 
dismantling of the Department of Indian Affairs and proposed that Indigenous people be 
incorporated into the rest of Canada. The White Paper was met with widespread opposition 
from Aboriginal leaders throughout the country, who had long done a poor job of coordinating 
their activities, but banded together effectively to battle the federal government’s proposal with 
                                                 
5 Non-status Indians included those with mixed heritage, Indian women who married non-Indian men (and their 
children). Joining the military, obtaining a college degree or becoming a professional automatically resulted in 
the loss of Indian status. The Metis and Inuit were not classified as “Indian”. 
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one voice. They demanded the White Paper retracted and called for more control over their 
lives and communities (Poelzer and Coates 2015, 18).   
1.2 Aboriginal self-government 
Given the extreme heterogeneity in the circumstances of Aboriginal nations and peoples, there 
have emerged several different models of Aboriginal self-government in Canada. Differences 
due to economic circumstances, geography, demographics, political history and ideology 
among the various Aboriginal groups affect what model of self-government is appropriate. The 
models differ by the constitutional status of the Aboriginal governments and their relationship 
to the Canadian state system. Self-government allows an Aboriginal group to take control of 
jurisdictions that are under the purview of the provincial or federal government. Depending on 
the Aboriginal group and its characteristics, a wide array of municipal, regional, provincial and 
federal responsibilities can be included in a self-government agreement.   
The federal government has identified three major models of self-government: nation, public 
and communal. The nation self-government model is appropriate for those Aboriginal groups 
with exclusive territories and territorial jurisdiction (e.g. reserves or settlements), and who 
exhibit a strong sense of shared identity. This form of self-government would have exclusive 
jurisdiction on core issues and could negotiate with other governments on more peripheral 
matters. It is up to each group to determine eligibility criteria. It could also incorporate elements 
of traditional governance and different levels of government (community, regional, territorial). 
The public model of self-government exercises jurisdiction over a geographically defined area, 
where all residents within the area participate equally in the government. The communal model 
of self-government is suited for those Aboriginal groups that are not land-based or territorial. 
In general, that will include urban Aboriginals, non-status Indians and some Metis. This model 
of self-government could encompass urban reserves or Aboriginal neighborhoods  
Indigenous self-governance is a heavily discussed and researched part of Canadian politics. As 
of August 2016, there were 25 completed comprehensive land claims agreements in Canada, 
18 of which includes self-government provisions. In addition, there were four stand-alone self-
government agreements. As of June 2014, there were 99 ongoing comprehensive land claims 
and/or self-government negotiations (AANDC, 2014).  
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With the Nunavimmiut6 rejecting their proposed self-government agreement and with a number 
of other indigenous groups making their decision in the coming years, this is an area of great 
interest. However, deciding on what factors facilitate a successful negotiation is a difficult task. 
Every agreement, whether it is a self-government or a CLC agreement, is tailored to address 
specific needs of each Aboriginal group; there is no template to follow.  
My interest in this project started at a time when many indigenous communities in Canada were 
participating in self-government negotiations and the outcomes of these negotiations were very 
much uncertain. A lesson learned from the failed self-government proposal in Nunavik is that 
a successful framework agreement, an agreement in principle and a successfully negotiated 
final agreement, can still fail to pass. Aboriginal governance has become a widely researched 
topic since the creation of the predominantly Inuit territory of Nunavut. Scholars have written 
highly detailed accounts of Canada's self-government policy, both describing its evolution over 
time and what kind of self-government models that have been produced by different stages of 
policy. Scholars, such as Belanger (2008), Cairns (2000) and Flanagan (2008), have all written 
detailed accounts of Canada's self-government policy and its real-world implications on the 
indigenous population.   
1.3 Structural outline of the thesis  
In the next chapter, I will provide a short background history of Canada’s self-government 
policy and how it has evolved over time, which clarifies the context in which self-government 
negotiations take place.  
Chapter three introduces the theoretical framework for my thesis. I will start by explaining the 
nature of the negotiation process, and present the actors involved and their respective roles in 
the negotiations. The analytical framework consists of four factors thought to promote a 
successful outcome in self-government negotiations: compatibility of government and 
Aboriginal group goals, minimal use of confrontational tactics, strong Aboriginal group 
cohesion and positive government perceptions of Aboriginal group. Additionally, I draw upon 
the literature of historical institutionalism to consider the effects of Canada’s evolving self-
government policy and the institutional structure in the regions on negotiation outcomes.  
In the fourth chapter, I present and elaborate upon the research design that has been selected 
for this thesis. I conduct a multiple case study of two Inuit self-government negotiations. This 
                                                 
6 The suffix –miut means “from” in Inuktitut. A Nunavimmiut is therefore somebody from Nunavik. 
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chapter also touches upon methodological challenges, case selection, process tracing and data 
source material.  
Chapter five consists of the analysis of the negotiation processes in the two regions. This 
chapter focuses on the unfolding of significant events and characterizes the key steps in the 
processes leading up to the conclusion of the negotiations.  
Chapter six explores how the theoretical framework can explain the divergent outcomes by 
examining the causal process observations and how they relate to the separate factors thought 
to explain settlements and non-settlements. I argue that the divergent outcomes in the two cases 
best can be explained by the lack of group cohesion in Nunavik as compared to Nunatsiavut. 
In addition, I find that the layering of self-government policy and the emergence of a multilevel 
governance structure in Nunavik affected the self-government negotiations in Nunavik 
negatively, as opposed to Nunatsiavut that was positively impacted by the more extensive self-
government policy and where there did not exist a multilevel governance structure. 
The last chapter summarizes the main findings. This chapter also discusses the implications of 





2. The evolving institutional framework of Canada's self-government 
policy 
To cover Canada’s relationship with its Aboriginal population is a task that is far beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, in order to fully comprehend the modern land claims process, it 
is necessary to recognize its history. What follows is a summary of Canada’s self-government 
policy, how it has evolved and how the indigenous population has mobilized in order to attain 
self-government rights within a federal-provincial constitutional order. I start with a summary 
of Indian policy before 1945. The next section looks at the postwar period, which is 
characterized by many attempts to amend the Indian Act, further assimilate the Aboriginal 
population, and an increasing Aboriginal population. The last part addresses the period after 
the federal government published the Penner Report, which explicitly recognized the right of 
Aboriginal self-government.  
2.1 Indian policy in Canada before 1945 
Official government policy towards Aboriginal people in Canada has historically been 
assimilationist in nature. British imperial policy recognized an indigenous right to land, and 
adopted the policy that imperial representatives should enter into treaty agreements to cede or 
extinguish Aboriginal rights in return for reserved lands and goods. With the enactment of the 
Indian Act in 1876, the federal government had a way of regulating almost every aspect of 
Indian reserved lands and community life (Scholtz, 2006, 40). The Indian Act was a 
compilation of the legislation the Canadian government and previous colonial governments had 
developed in order to deal with its indigenous population (Miller 2009, 190).  
The process of signing land secession agreements continued until 1921. After this, Aboriginal 
peoples had two choices: either to enter into lawsuits with the government, or to pressure the 
federal government to recognize Aboriginal title. The overriding goal of Canada’s Indian policy 
was to assimilate the indigenous population, and thus there was not much toleration for Indian 
land claims, not to speak of Aboriginal self-government. Aboriginal attempts to mobilize were 
swiftly shut down by the federal government with the 1927 amendment to the Indian Act, which 
made it illegal to raise money to pursue a land claim against the Crown (Scholtz 2006, 41). 
This amendment prohibited the ability of the Aboriginal people to enter into lawsuits and 
pressure the federal government, the two options that were available to them.  
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As the senior public servant of the Indian Affairs branch stated in 1920 , “Our object is to 
continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body 
politic, and there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department” (Miller 2000, 282). Until 
the end of World War II, the official policy on Indian affairs was one of assimilation and 
compulsory enfranchisement.  
2.2 The postwar social welfare agenda 
By the end of the Second World War, the indigenous population in Canada was on the rise, and 
had been since 1936. This was of great concern to the federal government as increasing 
education costs and other expenditures directed towards the indigenous were not budgeted, as 
they were a population group that was supposed to disappear. In 1945, the North American 
Indian Brotherhood (NAIB) saw the light of day, a national political organization which 
remained limited for years due to lack of resources, but its foundation was an important step in 
mobilizing the indigenous on a national level.  
When the Liberal Party won the election in 1949, the newly elected prime minister Louis St. 
Laurent moved Indian Affairs into the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. This move 
clearly signaled the ideological course that this new government had for the Indian policy, as 
it showed commitment to the continued assimilation of indigenous peoples, which did not differ 
a great deal of that of previous governments. When John Diefenbaker of the Conservative Party 
took over as prime minster in 1957, prospects for change improved. A conservative populist, 
he sought to eliminate “second-class citizenship” and extended status Indians7 the 
unconditional right to vote (Scholtz 2006, 47). The Diefenbaker government was enthusiastic 
about individual civil rights for Aboriginals, but less so about the collectivist nature of 
Aboriginal rights, which it felt would distract from integration (Scholtz 2006. 47-48). Concrete 
accomplishments regarding the federal Indian policy still eluded the government, mainly 
because of the disregard of collective rights, but also because of Diefenbaker’s ensuing 
minority government, and later on with Prime Minister Pearson’s focus on foreign policy in the 
Cold War era.  
With the increasing amounts of media reports depicting the poor state of Aboriginal socio-
economic and living conditions, the federal and provincial politicians were pressured to 
improve the situation. In 1963, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration commissioned 
                                                 
7 First Nations that are subject to the Indian Act, excluding the Inuit, Metis and First Nations individuals who for 
whatever reason are not registered with the federal government.  
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a number of studies to assess the situation, which later on took the name the Hawthorn-
Tremblay report. The report rejected assimilation as a policy goal and proposed that Indians 
should be regarded as “citizens plus”, benefitting from regular citizenship in addition to 
maintaining those rights guaranteed as a result of their Indian status (Belanger & Newhouse 
2008, 3). The report also argued that the Aboriginals should have the ability to govern 
themselves and should be encouraged to take on governing responsibilities. “In these 
recommendations, we have a notion that Indians could govern themselves in some fashion 
within the constitutional structure of Canada” (ibid 2008, 4).  
With Indian welfare policy on the national agenda and under intense media scrutiny, the 
government created the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) in 
1966, with its own minister at the cabinet table. With newly elected Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau and the first majority government in six years, the stage was set for a review of the 
federal government’s Indian affairs policy. Trudeau, like many of his predecessors, strongly 
valued the protection of individual rights and objected to the notion of ethnic rights. A Statement 
of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, commonly known as the White Paper, was 
issued in 1969, and rejected the idea of Indians as citizens plus. The policy proposed repeal of 
the Indian Act, and positioned Indians as “Canadian citizens with neither special status nor 
valid claims to special administrative provisions or unique legal standing” (Belanger & 
Newhouse 2008, 4).  
The white paper said little about Indian governance, and was met with great resistance from 
Aboriginal leaders all over the country.  The government officially withdrew the white paper 
in 1971, but would not so easily turn away from the policy’s ideological assumptions. The 
government’s retreat from the policy presented a critical juncture in Canadian Indian policy, 
and more voices within the cabinet came to support the recognition of special Aboriginal rights 
through direct negotiation (Scholtz 2006, 59). In 1973, the Supreme Court of Canada’s Calder 
v. The Attorney General of British Columbia decision recognized the existence of Aboriginal 
rights, and effectively started the phase of modern treaties. During the aftermath of the Calder 
decision, Aboriginal organizations became more and more influential, resulting in the inclusion 
of the National Indian Brotherhood, the Inuit Committee on National Issues and the Native 
Council of Canada in constitutional discussions in 1978.  
The seminal document entitled Indian Government, by the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians 
(FSI), published in 1977, was the first to formally articulate the principles of Aboriginal self-
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government. The document stated that all Indians have the same fundamental and basic 
principles upon which they can continue to build their governments. They noted that Indian 
nations historically are self-governing and that Indians have inalienable rights, including the 
“inherent sovereignty of Indian nations, the right to self-government, jurisdiction over their 
lands and citizens and the power to enforce the terms of the Treaties” (Belanger & Newhouse 
2008, 7-8). The publishing of this paper started a debate on what Aboriginal self-government 
would be in Canada.  
In 1982, the government commissioned the Penner Report in order to define the parameters of 
Aboriginal self-government. The committee in charge of penning the report travelled across 
Canada to get first-hand testimony from Native people, and presented their findings in 
November 1983. The report stated that the relationship between Native people and the federal 
government was not working, and that Indian people have the right to a special place within 
the Canadian Constitution. The committee advanced a view of Aboriginal government that was 
an enhanced municipal-style government within the federal legislative framework (Belanger & 
Newhouse 2008, 9).  
The report, however, envisaged three distinct features for Aboriginal self-government: (1) 
Indian government should be seen as a ‘distinct order’ of government within the Canadian 
system and with negotiated fiscal arrangements and jurisdictions. (2) The right of Aboriginal 
self-government should be explicitly recognized, stated and entrenched in the Constitution of 
Canada. (3) The report defined a set of areas of authority for Aboriginal governments that 
included health care, economic and commercial development, land and resource use, education, 
child welfare, membership, social and cultural development, revenue-raising, justice and law 
enforcement, and intergovernmental relations (Belanger & Newhouse 2008, 9-10). This report 
is significant because it is the first federal recognition of Aboriginal self-government in Canada 
and presented historical evidence for the FSI claim that Indians have historically been self-
governing.  
2.3 Post-Penner 1984- 
In the mid-1980s, the Conservative government under Brian Mulroney indicated early on that 
it was willing to change the nature of the federal stance on Aboriginal self-government. They 
published the Nielson Report in 1985, which was radically different from the previous Penner 
Report, and saw the problem of Indian government more as a matter of administration and 
delivery service than a political and constitutional issue (Cassidy & Bish 1989, 20-21). In the 
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face of widespread dissatisfaction with the report in Indian communities, the government 
commissioned a new report in December of 1985. The Coolican Report suggested that the 
government’s position on and activities in relation to self-government could not be detached 
from land claims or Aboriginal rights. Coolican urged the government to turn toward 
recognition, whereas the Nielson Report had tilted more towards assimilation (Cassidy & Bish 
1989, 21-22).  
The confusing and contradictory reports regarding Aboriginal self-government that came out 
during the Mulroney era were reinforced by the actions of the Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development (DIAND). David Crombie, the minister of DIAND, proclaimed in 
1986 that self-government was a major priority for his department, and argued for an approach 
that emphasized collaboration and consultation with Indian governments. Aboriginal people 
would decide the pace at which self-government would emerge. The self-government programs 
that were initiated under Crombie’s leadership were, however, not in accordance with his 
intentions. DIAND would decide when “properly developed” Indian communities were ready 
for self-government, a more advanced place within the federal-provincial framework and the 
limits within which self-government would evolve (Cassidy & Bish 1989, 22.23).  
In 1986, the government introduced their two-track approach to the subject of self-government, 
where track 1 constitutes a constitutional negotiation where the principles of self-government 
would be addressed. Track 2 addressed Aboriginal self-government in a day-to-day manner 
through a process of community-based negotiations, which would achieve practical benefits to 
individual communities and determine the pace of their progress towards self-government. The 
Indian community was skeptical of this two-track approach, as they wondered “if the federal 
government’s approach was not assimilation clothed as recognition” (Cassidy and Bish 1989, 
23). When the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act was signed in 1986 after fifteen years 
of negotiations, it was seen as a unique effort of the federal government to establish Aboriginal 
self-government apart from the attempts to entrench Aboriginal self-government rights in the 
constitution, which had been set in motion with the Penner Report. The act gave the Sechelt 
jurisdiction over different parts of the community such as taxation and the control of band land.  
Just two years prior to the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, another landmark self-
government agreement was signed, the Cree-Naskapi Act. This is considered the first 
Aboriginal self-government agreement in Canada. In return for extinguishing their Aboriginal 
title and ceding vast tracts of territory, the Cree and Naskapi of northern Quebec were given 
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control over resources and varied powers of self-government (Belanger & Newhouse 2008 11). 
However, as Papillon notes, the act was quite limited in the transfer of powers, as the Aboriginal 
leadership had to follow specific policies handed down from Ottawa and follow budgets set by 
the federal government (2009, 188).  
The 1980s also saw several amendments to the Indian Act that were intended to delegate 
different powers to Aboriginals. While Aboriginal groups supported the intention of the 
delegation of powers, they would Have preferred a replacement of the Indian Act in the place 
of an amendment (Cassidy & Bish 1989, 25). The passage of Bill C-31 in June 1985 gave 
Aboriginal groups the power to manage band membership, and the 1988 Indian-led amendment 
to the Indian Act gave Aboriginal groups control over the development of reserve land and the 
ability to collect taxes (Ibid 1989, 25).  
Between 1983 and 1987, four First Minister conferences took place, which included the Prime 
Minister, the Premiers and the leaders from four national Aboriginal organizations. These 
conferences led to two different proposal to amend the Constitution. The Meech Lake Accord, 
designed primarily to bring Quebec into the constitution, failed to ratify in 1990. The 
Charlottetown Accord of 1992 recognized the inherent right to self-government, and that it 
should be interpreted as one of three orders of government in Canada. The proposed 
Charlottetown Accord of 1992 was, if nothing else, a symbolic step in the process of 
recognition of the Aboriginal right to self-government. This was the first time that the federal 
government and the provincial governments explicitly recognized the legitimacy of Aboriginal 
governments. The Charlottetown Accord failed in a countrywide referendum in 1992, but the 
principle of an inherent right to self-government was now a part of the Canadian political 
landscape.  
In 1990, Mohawks living in Kanesatake, Quebec erected a blockade to prevent the municipality 
of Oka from expanding a golf course on traditional Mohawk land. This sparked a 78-day armed 
standoff between Mohawks and Canadian soldiers, leaving one police officer killed. The Oka 
crisis, as it has been named, combined with the two failed constitutional conferences, propelled 
Prime Minister Mulroney to establish the Royal Commission of Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) in 
1991. The RCAP produced a comprehensive five-volume report tackling several issues facing 
Aboriginal groups in Canada at the time. Self-government and mutual recognition were 
important parts of the findings of the commission and the report included 17 different case 
studies of current Aboriginal governments. The RCAP reinforces the claim that Aboriginal 
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groups have an inherent right to self-government, which is affirmed through section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 (RCAP 1996, 647).  
The Commission also identified three major models of self-government – public government, 
nation government and the community of interest model (RCAP 1996, 233). The nation self-
government model would be best suited for those Aboriginal groups with exclusive territories 
and territorial jurisdiction, such as reserves or settlements, and allow the group to have control 
over citizenship. The public government model would exercise jurisdiction over a 
geographically restricted area, and would encompass all residents in the area. This sort of model 
has since been undertaken by Nunavut Territory. The community of interest government model 
would be best suited for Aboriginal groups who are not territorial. Both the nation and public 
government model could have different levels of government, e.g. Community, regional or 
territorial (Frideres 2008, 131)  
In advance of the publication of RCAP, the federal government tabled their Inherent Right 
Policy (IRP) in 1995. This policy affirmed the inherent right to self-government under s.35(1), 
and states a clear preference for implementation through public government. The IRP started a 
public debate in Canada on what the word 'inherent' meant in relation to self-government. The 
policy recognizes the right to self-government in matters "internal to their communities, 
integral to their unique cultures, identities, traditions, languages and institutions and with 
respect to their special relationship to their land and their resources" (Belanger 2008, 406). The 
IRP assures that self-government provisions may be negotiated as a part of a comprehensive 
land claims agreement.  
As we have seen, the policy on Aboriginal self-government has evolved significantly over the 
years. The next chapter will further elaborate on the self-government negotiation process, the 




3. Theory and practice  
The aim of the preceding chapter was to provide important background information and context 
for the theoretical and empirical chapters that follow. We shall now continue with introducing 
the theoretical framework, which will shed light on the factors thought to determine self-
government negotiation outcomes. This chapter begins by describing the process of negotiating 
self-government agreements in Canada, and identifying the role of the different actors in this 
process. Subsequently, the second section discusses Alcantara’s theoretical framework, which 
posits four factors that determine whether an Aboriginal group can complete a self-government 
agreement. Much of this framework draws upon the literature of rational choice theory and 
emphasizes the preferences and incentives of the different actors. In order to attain a more 
comprehensive and accurate explanation of self-government negotiations, I draw upon the 
literature of historical institutionalism to consider the effects Canada’s evolving land claims 
and self-government policy and other contextual factors in the two regions. I will finish this 
chapter by presenting the concept of multilevel governance, which describes the 
deconcentration of the policy-making process in Aboriginal-state relations and how there are 
more actors and levels involved in the decision-making processes.  
3.1 The negotiation process and the actors involved 
The federal government of Canada prefers to devolve self-government powers to Aboriginal 
groups through a comprehensive three-stage negotiation process. The range of powers 
devolved and the contents of the agreement, will depend on the Aboriginal group and whether 
it is a combined land claims and self-government agreement or a stand-alone self-government 
agreement. However, the negotiation process is similar in both cases. Aboriginal groups submit 
a proposal to be verified and accepted by the federal and relevant provincial governments. Once 
both governments have accepted the proposal, the three parties can begin negotiating a 
framework agreement. This agreement is basic in many respects, as it sets out the issues to be 
negotiated later, how they will be negotiated and by what date they must be resolved.  
Once a framework agreement is negotiated, the parties move on to a non-legally binding 
agreement-in-principle (AIP). Negotiations for the AIP are typically the most difficult and 
time-consuming part of the process (Alcantara 2013, 16). The AIP serves as the basis for the 
drafting of the final agreement, but does not resolve all negotiation issues. Rather, it can leave 
some of the more contentious issues for final agreement negotiations. Once the AIP is finalized 
and approved by the three parties, they can move on to the negotiations for the final agreement.  
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The final agreement, as the name indicates, is the last stage of the negotiation process. The 
main purpose of the final agreement is to translate the AIP into a complete agreement and to 
formalize the negotiated terms. The final agreement is subject to a ratification vote by the 
Aboriginal group, and needs to pass through Parliament and the relevant sub-national 
legislature in order to become a constitutional document under section 35 of the Canadian 
Constitution.  
3.1.1 Aboriginal group 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to adequately define the role of the Aboriginal 
group in a tripartite negotiation setting. How does one categorize Aboriginal groups in the 
setting of self-government negotiations? There are several different possible categories which 
one could put 'Aboriginal group' within. For instance, one could categorize it as a social 
movement. Susan Phillips (2004) defines a social movement as a network of organizations, and 
not a single organization, which form and express collective identities. Social movements also 
undertake collective action that is intended to influence state and society. However, the concept 
of ‘social movement’ does not grasp the extent of the complex situation for the Inuit. For the 
first part, even though Aboriginal groups consist of several organizations and individuals, 
during self-government negotiations they operate as a single organization. Secondly, even 
though Aboriginal groups form collective identities, negotiations lead to individual settlements 
for a single Aboriginal group: the Inuit in Nunavik fight for the interests of the Inuit in Nunavik 
and not for all Inuit. For the last part, "the collective action undertaken by Aboriginal groups 
in the comprehensive land claims process is not intended to influence both state and society" 
(Alcantara 2008, 68). The Aboriginal groups that are a part of a negotiation process are less 
concerned with influencing the non-Aboriginal society.  
Another possible categorization of ‘Aboriginal group’ is as an interest group. However, this is 
also not completely accurate. Phillips states that interests groups are formal structural 
organizations, with defined policies and infrastructure. In addition, their focus is on the state 
and influencing public policy choices from the inside, rather than from the outside (Phillips 
2004, 325).  
Alcantara (2008) argues that Aboriginal groups in the setting of self-government negotiations 
are neither social movements nor interest groups, but are rather "groups of individuals 
represented by highly complex quasi-governments, and band and community governments" 
(69). To illustrate this, one does not need to look further than the role of Makivik Corporation 
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in Nunavik. Makivik was created as a result of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement 
(JBNQA), the comprehensive land claims agreement that was concluded in 1975. Makivik is a 
private, not-for-profit corporation, owned by the Nunavik Inuit, and mandated to protect the 
rights, interests and financial compensation provided by the JBNQA. In terms of managing the 
financial compensation, it does this through a variety of typical corporate activities, and through 
their subsidiary companies: they own two airlines, a fuel services enterprise, a construction 
company which is to act as a general contractor for the construction of social housing and 
several joint ventures in sectors such as tourism, fishing and shipping. (Janda 2006, 389-390). 
In addition to their extensive economic ventures, Makivik contributes to the management of 
the region with support to organizations that are managed by the public governance bodies, as 
well as negotiating the self-government agreement on behalf of the Inuit.   
The Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) also falls into this category. It is a non-profit organization 
that was established in 1973 in order to promote the constitutional, political and human rights 
of the Labrador Inuit, in addition to being involved in fishery, wildlife, natural resource 
management, and taking control over several government services from the province in health 
and education sector. They also represented the Labrador Inuit in the comprehensive land 
claims negotiations. 
3.1.2 The role of the federal government 
Aboriginal policy has historically been dominated by the powerful bureaucracy of the 
Department of Indian Affairs, today known as Indian and Northern Affairs (INAC). The role 
of the department has shifted from one of paternalistic control as a service provider to a funding 
agency concerned with promoting the development of autonomous communities (Papillon 
2008a, 70). Most interactions between INAC and Aboriginal governments are through civil 
servants who are regionally-based, with a limited mandate to engage in unforeseen scenarios. 
However, INAC’s position as lead negotiator in land claims gives the agency substantial 
influence. INAC ministers and deputy ministers are important middlemen in persuading 
ministers of other departments who tend to have veto power on issues that affect their 
department (Alcantara 2013, 17). 
 INAC is responsible for drafting the negotiation mandate, which is then up for cabinet 
consideration. Once the mandate is approved, INAC is responsible for enforcing it and to seek 
modifications to it on behalf of the Aboriginal group and the provincial government. While 
INAC is the main department for dealing with Aboriginal affairs, other departments are playing 
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an increasingly important role. Central agencies such as the Privy Council Office, the Prime 
Minister’s Office and Treasury Board are “increasingly involved in negotiations over self-
government and land claims as well as in the definition of conditions for the allocation of fiscal 
transfers” (Papillon 2008a, 71). A motivated Prime Minister can also unilaterally alter a 
mandate to speed up the negotiations (see Dewar 2009).  
The chief federal negotiators are external consultants and act as the federal government’s main 
contact with the Aboriginal group. Along with the minister and deputy minister, the chief 
federal negotiator is one of the most influential actors in the negotiation process. Ideally, the 
chief negotiator is one with extensive knowledge about the Aboriginal group and the territory 
with which he is negotiating, and is able to build a positive relationship and search for 
innovation (Interview B 2017).  
3.1.3 The role of the provincial government  
Until the mid-1980s, provincial governments’ involvement has been quite limited, with many 
provinces not even having a ministry solely dedicated to Aboriginal affairs. Newfoundland and 
Labrador’s Aboriginal affairs portfolio is located in the department of Labrador and Aboriginal 
Affairs, and during Premier Clyde Wells’ reign (1989-96), the Premier himself was minister 
for Aboriginal affairs. Quebec was earlier in developing a ministry dedicated to relations with 
Aboriginal peoples, which it did in the early 1960s with the establishment of the Direction 
générale du Nouveau-Quebec, which would later become the Secrétariat aux affaires 
autochtones (SAA).  
As is the case for the federal level, provincial department of Aboriginal affairs is the lead 
agency in charge of land claims and self-government negotiations. They draft the mandate, 
enforce it and recommend changes to it, if necessary. The provinces have constitutional 
ownership and jurisdiction over several key negotiation stakes in land claims and self-
government negotiations. Provinces have jurisdiction over land ownership and natural 
resources, taxation, municipalities, fish and wildlife, and self-government powers. Federal 
policy declares that provincial governments must be involved in claims that are located within 
a province, and recognizes the importance of the provincial governments (Haysom 1990).  
A large part of the actual negotiating tends to be between the provincial government and the 
Aboriginal governments (Alcantara 2013, 19). Provincial governments are significant parties 
to the negotiations and, as such, are veto players. Christa Scholtz (2006) has found that sub-
national governments, such as provincial governments, are more reluctant to adopt Aboriginal 
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treaty negotiation policies, and are more likely to protect established economic interests (8). 
Attempts by central governments to impose negotiations policies will meet resistance from the 
sub-national governments, as they tend to have a larger effect on provincial powers and 
jurisdiction.  
3.2 Analytical framework  
In Richard Simeon's seminal Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, he examines the role of direct 
negotiation between the executives of different governments in Canada. He looks at what 
factors account for its importance, how it operates in national policy-making, and its 
consequences (Simeon 2006, 5). Simeon focuses on three cases in particular (1) the federal-
provincial negotiation of a universal national pension plan, (2) the division of financial 
resources among the provinces, and (3) the re-evaluation and revising of Canada's written 
constitution. He identifies eight factors that explain the dynamics and outcomes of federal-
provincial policy making. Simeon’s (2006, 12-16) eight variables, which all interact with each 
other, are:  
 social and institutional context,  
 actors,  
 issues,  
 sites and procedures,  
 goals and objectives,  
 political resources,  
 strategies and tactics,  
 outcomes and consequences.  
Social and institutional context refers to how some of the basic characteristics of Canadian 
society and its institutional arrangements can shape the form of the negotiation process. The 
underlying social and institutional factors are expected to play a major role in determining the 
power relations between the negotiating parties. "They should also affect the issues that arise 
and the goals, tactics, and resources of individual participants as they debate the issues" 
(Simeon 2006, 13). The term "actors" refers to the participants in the negotiation process, and 
in Simeon's case, that is the different governments. He mostly deals with the governments as 
single units. "Issues" refer to the stakes in the negotiation process. Issues can vary in different 
ways, all of which can affect the way they are negotiated. The actors' perception of the issues 
at hand may differ, and therefore different actors may treat the same issues differently.  
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"Sites and procedures" refers to where the negotiations are done, how they are conducted, and 
if the procedures favor some at the expense of others. In short, what effect does the structure 
have on the process? "Goals and objectives" are the set of values and interests the different 
parties bring to the negotiation. Are the interests of the negotiating parties compatible or 
incompatible in terms "of the proper roles of the two levels of government" (Simeon 2006, 14-
15). The sixth variable, "political resources", is the allocation of resources between the two 
levels of government, and is a measure of power relations.  A resource is, as Robert A. Dahl 
defines it, "anything that can be used to sway the specific choices or strategies of another 
individual" (1961, 226).  
"Strategies and tactics" is a more complex variable, and is heavily influenced by the previous 
factors. "Given a set of objectives, a certain strategic environment, and available political 
resources, the actors engage in various strategies to gain their ends" (Simeon 2006, 15). The 
range of available strategies is wide, and can vary from persuasion, trading of favors and even 
violence. Simeon distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate tactics, where the former 
increases conflict and hostility (Simeon 2006, 255). "Outcomes and consequences" refers to 
which actors achieved their goals and which failed, as well as what consequences the outcomes 
have on the actors themselves, the system as a whole and future negotiations.  
In Negotiating the Deal, Alcantara modifies Simeon's framework to make it better suited to 
examine the comprehensive land claims process. He draws heavily upon rational intuitionalism 
to argue that there are four factors that explain settlements or non-settlements in comprehensive 
land claims negotiations (Alcantara 2013, 5). The first factor is compatibility of goals between 
aboriginal and federal/provincial actors. It matters to what extent federal and provincial goals 
are common and conflicting. "The goals of the two parties are likely to be compatible when the 
Aboriginal group is willing to accept a final agreement that exists and operates within the 
political, economic, and legal context of the Canadian constitutional order" (Alcantara 2008, 
95). This factor relates to Simeon's "goals and objectives" variable, which emphasizes whether 
the goals of the different actors are compatible or not. An Aboriginal group that has a stronger 
sense of Aboriginal sovereignty will find it more difficult to complete a treaty.  
The second factor that generates a successful outcome is the minimal use of confrontational 
tactics by the Aboriginal group. The governments prefer to use negotiations in order to 
complete treaties because they see them to be less costly in terms of money, reputation and 
political capital than alternatives like protest, litigation and lobbying (Alcantara 2013, 59). 
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Groups that adhere to any of those more confrontational tactics are therefore less likely to be 
invited to the negotiation table. Groups that use more conventional methods and that stay within 
the established framework are more likely to complete a treaty. This factor is similar to 
Simeon's "strategies and tactics" variable with regards to the use of legitimate and illegitimate 
tactics.  In this setting, confrontational tactics include "protests, litigation, domestic and 
international media campaigns, and appeals to international tribunals, organizations, and 
governments" (Alcantara 2008, 95).  
The third factor is the degree of unity within an Aboriginal group in the context of the 
negotiation process. The internal workings of an Aboriginal group engaged in negotiations can 
affect the possible outcomes. Divisive leadership and internal division can be disruptive for the 
negotiation process as it can bring unstable negotiation teams and positions to the negotiation 
table. In addition, socioeconomic distress is a part of this factor. Regions plagued with alcohol 
and substance abuse, suicide and vandalism are less focused on completing a deal, and perhaps 
more interested in finding solutions for these community problems. Domestic problems and 
internal conflicts can overtake any sustained community interest or effort to negotiate an 
agreement (Alcantara 2013, 63). Group cohesiveness is crucial to the extent to which internal 
problems enter into the negotiation process. This factor draws both from Simeon's "actors" 
variable, because it deals with individual participants' attitudes and behaviors, and from 
"political resources", where one of the most important political resources is political support 
from the underlying population (Simeon 2006, 204).  
The final factor that leads to positive outcomes in comprehensive land claims negotiations is 
positive perception of aboriginal group capacity by the two negotiating governments. 
Government perceptions are related to the Aboriginal group's use of political resources in order 
to convince the governments of their capacity for financial accountability, and their capacity to 
both negotiate an agreement and implement it (Alcantara 2008, 97). This also relates to the 
Aboriginal group's acculturation. As Nadasdy (2003) notes in his research on state-Aboriginal 
relations:  
If Aboriginal peoples wish to participate in co-management, land claims negotiations, 
and other processes that go along this new relationship, then they must engage in 
dialogue with wildlife biologists, lawyers, and other government officials […] if they 
wish to be taken seriously, then their linguistic utterances must conform to the very 
particular forms and formalities of the official linguistic field (5).   
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Table 3.1: Factors that affect which self-government negotiations outcomes are obtained 
Factors promoting a successful outcome Factors leading to an unsuccessful outcome  
Compatibility of government and 
Aboriginal group goals  
Incompatibility of government and 
Aboriginal group goals 
Minimal use of confrontational tactics by 
Aboriginal group 
Frequent use of confrontational tactics by 
the Aboriginal group 
Strong Aboriginal group cohesion  Weak Aboriginal group cohesion 
Positive government perceptions of 
Aboriginal group capacity 
Negative government perceptions of 
Aboriginal group capacity 
Source: Alcantara (2013) 
In addition to those four factors affecting outcomes, four factors affect the speed of the 
negotiations.  Trust relationships can affect the pace of the negotiations, and specifically the 
ability of Aboriginal negotiators and officials to develop professional trust relationships with 
federal and provincial negotiators (Alcantara 2013, 68). A solid trust relationship will allow for 
more compromise and focus on the issues at hand. Government and external negotiators can 
affect the pace in two specific ways. The choice of a non-bureaucratic negotiator can speed up 
the negotiations because she is not subject to the same hierarchical constraints as a bureaucratic 
negotiator. Second, the commitment and personality of the specific negotiator seem to have an 
effect on speed: the higher the degree of commitment to the proceedings, the faster it can go.  
Aboriginal groups with low competition for use of Aboriginal-claimed lands have the ability to 
complete a deal quicker than those with high competition. Level of competition refers to the 
proximity to non-Aboriginal communities, claims for lands that are isolated will likely be 
completed in a faster fashion. The last factor that can affect the speed of negotiations is 
development pressures. Governments are in no hurry to complete deals that are subject to third 
party interests, such as licenses for resource extraction or planned construction, since 
government and businesses can benefit from exploitation without a treaty. However, if the land 
claim includes valuable lands where there do not exist any third party interests, this can speed 
up the negotiations process, as a treaty is necessary in order to start an extraction process. An 
example of this is when nickel was discovered in Voisey's Bay in Labrador, an area which was 
included in both the Inuit and Innu land claim. Government actors, especially provincial ones, 
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felt strong development pressures to speed up the negotiations in order to start resource 
extraction (Alcantara 2008, 99-100). Competition and development pressures over land and 
resource development, however, will not be transferable to self-government negotiations that 
occur separate from land claims negotiations.   
3.3 Institutional factors 
Absent from Alcantara's framework is the role of institutional and other contextual factors at 
both the national and regional levels in affecting negotiations. Historical and cultural legacies 
enter into the framework as conditioning influences on the likelihood of aboriginal groups 
adopting the behaviors and goals that government actors require to complete treaties (Alcantara 
2008, 74). Alcantara’s framework draws heavily from rational institutionalism, which posits 
that relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences, behave instrumentally in order to maximize 
the attainment of these preferences and do so in a highly strategic manner in ways that are 
relatively immune from contextual and institutional innovations (Hall & Taylor 1996, 944-
945). In addition, rational choice institutionalists tend to see politics as a series of collective 
action dilemmas where actors seek to maximize the attainment of their own preference, which 
will likely produce an outcome that is collectively and individually suboptimal.   
Even though power dynamics, preferences and choice of tactics are important in explaining 
treaty outcomes, the comprehensive land claims and self-government processes and policy 
environments have evolved significantly over the years (Alcantara & Davidson 2015, 558). 
Alcantara & Davidson argue for a "greater appreciation of the effects of any and all relevant 
contextual and institutional dynamics and changes at multiple levels" in their analysis of the 
Inuvialuit self-government agreement (ibid). In exploring the effects of Canada's evolving land 
claims and self-government policy and other contextual factors on self-government 
negotiations, they draw upon the literature of historical institutionalism, which argues that 
institutions play a significant role in influencing and structuring political outcomes (Steinmo, 
Thelen and Longstreth, 1992). In the realm of studies on the Canadian indigenous peoples and 
governance in the Arctic, this has been done on analyses of intra-jurisdictional relations in Inuit 
regions (see Alcantara & Wilson 2014), indigenous self-determination (see Papillon 2014) and 
the Canadian mineral resource policy's impact on Aboriginal peoples (see Grant et al 2014).     
Where rational choice theorists tend to see institutions in terms of their coordinating functions, 
historical institutionalists view institutions as the legacy of concrete historical processes 
(Thelen 1999, 382). Historical institutionalism is historical in the sense that it recognizes that 
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political development is a process that unfolds over time, and it is institutionalist in the sense 
that "it stresses that many of the contemporary implications of these temporal processes are 
embedded in institutions" (Pierson, 1996, 126). Institutions are defined as the formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions that structure the relationship between 
actors in a political community. They are, as Douglass North (1990) puts it, "the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, […] the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction" (3). This is indeed an inclusive and broad definition of institutions, ranging from 
rules of a constitutional order to the conventions governing organizational behavior. Self-
government policies can be interpreted as formal rules and procedures that determine how self-
government is negotiated. Once established, institutions can serve as intervening variables, 
which can structure how different actors interact with each other.  
Once created, institutions are highly resistant to change, but not immune. Exogenous shocks 
can spur radical institutional reconfigurations, but most institutional change occurs as a result 
of endogenous development, and is subtle and gradual over time.  Mahoney and Thelen (2009) 
suggest that gradual institutional change can take various forms, two of which I retain for the 
purpose of this analysis: layering and conversion.8  
Layering occurs when new rules are created and attached to already existing ones. Layering 
does not introduce new rules or institutions, but rather amends or adds on to existing rules. 
Layering will often take place when institutional challengers lack the capacity to challenge the 
original rules, and instead work within the existing system and add new rules on top of old 
ones. Each case of layering may seem insignificant, but can accumulate over time and lead to 
a significant change in the long run. As such, the federal government’s imposition of new 
policies on top of existing ones with respect to self-government negotiations can be understood 
as a process of layering. Another example is the diffusion of the policy process and the transfer 
of policies associated with Aboriginal multilevel governance, where new rules are layered over 
formal structures of authority without directly altering them. 
Conversion occurs when institutions are redirected to new goals or functions. The rules will 
formally remain the same, but are interpreted in new ways. This happens when actors exploit 
the inherent imprecision of the institutions. Such redirection of institutional resources often 
occurs through political contestation over what functions a particular institution should have, 
                                                 
8 Mahoney and Thelen (2009, 16-18) propose four different modes of institutional change: displacement, 




and especially when there is a gap between the rules of an institution and its enactment. An 
institution can thus remain largely unchanged in its structure and legal foundations but have an 
altered function.9 
The federal government policy on land claims and self-government has been subject to gradual 
institutional change since its introduction mainly through layering and conversion. Papillon 
(2008) argues that the reconfiguration of Aboriginal governance from a highly centralized and 
tightly controlled system to a more complex multilevel system can best be understood as a 
process of institutional adaptation through layering and conversion. In a comparison of 
indigenous multilevel governance in Canada and the United States, Papillon (2012) argues that 
the capacity of indigenous organizations to establish one’s claims in political arenas according 
to the political opportunity structure is essential to the agency of those organizations, as there 
are limited access points. This is a central, and often neglected, aspect of the layering process, 
the way in which actors position themselves within and in relation to the existing institutional 
framework.  
3.4 Multilevel governance in Inuit regions 
What happens in cases where minorities seeking greater territorial autonomy do not control 
institutions of one of the federated units? Aboriginal groups in Canada are a classic example of 
small, territorially defined, political entities who did not participate or were excluded from the 
federal compact10. In the field of Aboriginal politics, multilevel governance (MLG) has been 
used to describe how indigenous people in Canada have been able to change their relationship 
with the federal and provincial governments (Papillon 2012). Scholars have used the term to 
describe “a particular trend involving the emergence of non-traditional governmental actors, 
embedded in different territorial levels beyond the traditional federal and provincial ones” 
(Wilson, Alcantara and Rodon 2016, 45). The range of actors involved in the process of 
governing has come to include non-governmental and quasi-state actors. The literature on 
Aboriginal MLG is still in its early years, and there is still no consensus on exactly what it 
actually entails.  
                                                 
9 Makivik Corporation in Nunavik is an example of an institution that is largely unchanged in its structure, but 
its function does not correspond to its initial role. It is mandated to protect the rights and interests of the 
Nunavimmiut, but its activities have social and economic benefits for all the inhabitants of Nunavik, regardless 
of ethnicity.   
10 Deliberate attempts, such as not granting indigenous people voting rights, were made to prevent the formation 
of indigenous-controlled provinces, in hope that a lack of institutional basis would facilitate assimilation.  
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Some scholars prefer a narrower definition of the term. Alcantara and Nelles (2014) defines it 
as a “policy process that engages a variety of actors (governmental, nongovernmental, and/or 
quasi-governmental) located at different territorial scales, the outcomes of which are the 
product of negotiation (decision making processes or negotiated order)” (189). The most 
important and most difficult element to establish is the criteria of a negotiated order, seen as a 
counter measure to the more traditional hierarchical orders such as devolution and delegation. 
This approach focuses more on the specific nature of the way actors and levels interact in the 
policy process. MLG envisions “a broader dispersal of power and influence, both vertically to 
new government actors and horizontally to non-state and nongovernmental actors” (Wilson 
2017, 149). Aboriginal MLG in Canada operates through a spectrum of more or less formal 
mechanisms, ranging from co-op boards to the negotiation of comprehensive land claim 
agreements.  
A more structural perspective would view MLG as a “distinctive system of governance that has 
emerged as an alternative to the mechanisms associated with classic federalism or 
decentralization” (Papillon and Juneau 2013, 17). In this manner, MLG is defined as a 
distinctive institutional form that is layered over the existing federal structure, as a result of the 
federal government’s limited capacity to adapt to Aboriginal peoples as self-governing actors 
(Papillon 2012).  
MLG thus have three distinct perspectives. Firstly, it can be used strictly as a descriptive 
measure, and make the case that there are now more actors and levels involved in decision 
making processes that are affecting the life of Aboriginal peoples. Secondly, it can be used to 
“unpack the specific dynamics of these policy processes and asses who does what, and how, in 
shaping policy outcomes” (Papillon and Juneau 2013, 18). Thirdly, the structural approach 
focuses more on the origins and systemic consequences of MLG as it becomes institutionalized. 
As such, it is important to take into consideration a region’s institutional structure, as the 
development of MLG has introduced more actors in the decision-making process, when 
researching the political development of these regions.  
As we shall see in the analysis, it would be difficult to understand the variations in self-
government negotiation outcomes without emphasizing the factors introduced in this chapter. 




4. Methodological assessments 
There are two main approaches when designing a study, the quantitative and qualitative 
research designs. Quantitative research approaches are often lauded for having the ability to 
analyze several different variables across numerous cases. Qualitative approaches are described 
for their advantages in handling one or a few cases in a holistic and thorough manner. The long 
lasting debate between the two methodological camps can be attributed to the tradeoff between 
generalizability and complexity. This thesis is based on the qualitative approach, mainly 
because a small-N study is more suitable for my research question as I am investigating two 
cases in depth, namely, Nunavik and Nunatsiavut. The reasoning for why those two cases were 
chosen is elaborated upon in section 4.3.  
This chapter presents and justifies the methodological approaches applied throughout the 
thesis. First, the research question and research design, on which the thesis is based, will be 
presented. Second, I briefly present and discuss the multiple case study design, and how it is 
an appropriate choice in order to answer the research question. Third, I present process tracing, 
an analytical tool for causal inference, which is the research strategy applied to this study. 
Fourth, I discuss my data sources, which consist of semi-structured interviews, newspaper data, 
government documents, meeting minutes and academic studies. Lastly, I elaborate upon the 
case selection, introducing other potential cases and provide an overview of Nunavik and 
Nunatsiavut.   
4.1 Choosing the case study approach 
A central concern when conducting an inquiry is the selection of the method that provides the 
best tool to answer the research question. A place to start when considering which method is 
best suited is the framing of the research question. My research question is: Why did 
Nunatsiavut succeed in attaining self-government following extensive tripartite negotiations 
while Nunavik did not, when they share similar basic features? 
My intention with this is twofold. First, I want to understand why the specific two Aboriginal 
groups, that may appear similar, experienced disparate outcomes. Second, I aim to identify 
general factors that contribute to outcomes of self-government negotiations in general in 
Canada. The degree of certainty of my conclusions will of course be strongest for the two 
specific cases. I thus seek to discover the factors and variables that may influence a group’s 
chances for success. This is therefore a question of causation. The case study approach is 
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particularly suited to explaining “how” and “why” questions (Yin 2009, 9). Case studies often 
deal with establishing causation between variables and outcomes (George and Bennett 2005). 
This differs from the underlying logic behind quantitative research (large-N) which establishes 
broad correlations and frequencies rather than causality, according to critics (Ragin 2004).  
The aim of this study is to investigate factors that may have contributed to Nunavik and 
Nunatsiavut’s different outcomes after negotiations for self-government. Therefore a case study 
approach is a suitable one. Moreover, the research question focuses on two cases in particular, 
which gives the study a comparative dimension. Two cases offer “a balanced combination of 
descriptive depth and analytical challenge that progressively declines as more cases are added” 
(Tarrow 2010, 46). The inclusion of two cases permits the researcher to examine how common 
mechanisms are affected by the particular characteristics of each case.  
4.1.1 What is a case study? 
The literature offers different definitions of cases and case studies. George and Bennett (2005, 
17) defines a case as an instance of a class of events and the case study as a study of these 
events. According to Gerring (2004, 341), a case study is an “in-depth study of single unit (a 
relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger 
class of similar phenomena”. While Yin (2009, 15) defines it as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context”. One of 
the advantages of a case study is that it allows for careful consideration of contextual factors 
and how they may influence the workings of variables.  
Following the definition of George and Bennett (2005) one can argue that I conduct a 
comparative case study. Because there are two cases in my study it constitutes what is often 
called a multiple case study. Since there are more cases to draw conclusions from, the results 
are more robust than when using only one case (Johnson et al. 2008, 152).  Yin (2009, 56-57) 
argues that the multiple case study uses a replication logic in which every case is treated as an 
individual case study, and later on a cross-case comparison is conducted where the results of 
each individual case are compared. This is exactly what I intend to do in this thesis.  
The selection of cases corresponds to what Przeworski and Teune (1970) define as most similar 
system design (MSSD). The reasoning behind the MSSD-approach is straightforward as it aims 
to identify ‘intersystemic’ differences through the selection of cases with ‘intersystemic’ 
similarities. The logic is that “common systemic characteristics are conceived as ‘controlled 
for’, whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as explanatory variables. The number of 
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common characteristics sought is maximal and the number of not shared characteristics sought, 
minimal” (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 33). Assuming that the basis for Aboriginal self-
government in the population of the study is fairly similar, the MSSD provides the opportunity 
to follow this logic to identify deviating explanatory variables.  In this case, the variation in the 
dependent variable, namely the outcome of the self-government negotiations, was the prime 
tool for selection. This clearly breaks with the advice given by certain scholars to not choose 
on the dependent variable.11 However, choosing on the dependent variable is first a problem 
when “there is no variation to be explained” (Ragin 2004, 128). This vision has been criticized 
by case-oriented scholars such as Ragin (2004) as being irrelevant when applied to case studies.  
In addition to this, there are certain other caveats that have been proposed by quantitative 
scholars. Much of the critique towards case studies comes from the fact that one allegedly 
focuses on a limited amount of information, drawn from only one or a few cases, which may 
lead to a lack of representativeness (George and Bennett 2005, 28).  The case may not be 
representative of other cases, and the conclusions drawn might not be transferable. With 
quantitative, large-N studies one can more easily make generalizations. This can be traced back 
to Przeworski and Teune (1970) who favor parsimony and generality over accuracy, and 
therefore generating less accurate theories that can easily be transferred to different contexts.  
However, generalizability is not the objective of most qualitative research, where one is more 
interested in providing explanations for a defined set of outcomes. Explaining and identifying 
the links between cause and effect is just as important as making wide-spread generalizations 
(Ragin 2004). Yin (2009, 15) argues that analytical generalizations to general theory are 
possible with the case study, but should not be confused with statistical generalizations to 
populations and universes. It is important to keep these considerations in mind when discussing 
the implications of the findings.  
4.1.2 Why Aboriginal self-government in Canada? 
Why do I focus on Aboriginal self-government negotiations in Canada? I argue that Canada is 
a good place to study this issue for several reasons. Firstly, Canada as a federal state is one of 
a minority of countries that divide sovereignty between a central government and regional 
governments. Indigenous communities in Canada have organized and mobilized, within the 
federal system, against assimilation initiatives by seeking political and legal recognition of their 
title and rights. This mobilization has allowed delegated self-government rights to the 
                                                 
11 See King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 142) 
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Indigenous peoples through comprehensive land claims agreements, unlike any other country 
(Alcantara 2017, Poelzer and Coates, 2015). Secondly, in Canada there are over 1.4 million 
Aboriginal peoples, spread over 600 recognized groups. Twenty-nine different land claims 
and/or self-government agreements have been ratified since 1973. Thirdly, Canada’s 
Indigenous population has a high level of mobilization, with over 90 Aboriginal groups 
currently negotiating for self-government.  
Lastly, Nunavik and Nunatsiavut are examples of Arctic regions in Canada that are seeking 
autonomous status within an existing constituent unit of the Canadian federation, which in 
many respects constitutes a new phase in the evolution of Canadian federalism (Wilson 2008, 
71). These nested regions represent large and strategically significant territories within the 
Canadian Arctic. They hold vast deposits of resource wealth that are not only important for the 
provinces where they are located, but also for the regions themselves as they seek sustainable 
employment opportunities for their inhabitants. It is thus a somewhat new, but still very rich 
empirical context within which I will seek to answer my research question.   
4.1.3 Process tracing 
In addition to applying the research strategy of multiple case study, I will also apply the strategy 
of process tracing, which is an analytical tool for causal inference. Process tracing consists of 
the examination of diagnostic pieces of evidence within a case that can either contribute to 
supporting or overturning explanatory hypotheses (Bennett 2010, 208). Collier, Brady and 
Seawright (2010, 201) understands process tracing as “the examination of diagnostic pieces of 
evidence, commonly evaluated in a specific temporal sequence, with the goal of supporting or 
overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses”. The diagnostic pieces of evidence that are 
examined through process tracing are called causal process observations (CPO). Thus, process 
tracing consists of procedures for identifying specific CPOs and determining their contribution 
to causal inference.  
According to Collier et al (2010) qualitative researches that analyze processes rely upon CPOs. 
They define CPO as either a piece of evidence or insight that provides information about 
context or mechanism, and therefore contributes to a different kind of leverage in causal 
inference.  In other words, CPOs can be seen as proof regarding what happened in a process 
and why it happened the way that it did. The strength of process tracing lies in its in-depth 
insight. As a tool for causal inference, process tracing focuses on the unfolding of events or 
situations over time. Hence, careful description of the central steps in the processes being 
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analyzed is a foundation of process tracing, which in turn permits good analysis (Collier 2011, 
824)    
Although process tracing has many advantages, there have also been critiques raised. Process 
tracing has been criticized for taking the form of storytelling. Tilly (2002, 9-10) argues that 
although stories are an instinctive way of ordering experiences, they do not automatically help 
in generating causal analysis. However, this is an oversimplification of what process tracing 
entails. Venneson (2008) argues that process tracing differs from stories in three distinct ways. 
Firstly, process tracing is focused in the respect that it deals selectively with other certain 
aspects of the phenomenon. Secondly, process tracing is structured in the sense that the 
researcher is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical framework. Thirdly, 
“the goal of process tracing is ultimately to provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that 
leads to a specific outcome” (ibid, 235).  
4.2 Information about the data 
In order to answer my research question, I have drawn information from several different 
sources. One source of information comes from newspapers. There are according to Earl et al 
(2004) several problems with using newspaper data. The first problem relates to the issue of 
selection bias, meaning that newspapers will not cover all possible events. In fact, much of the 
comprehensive land claims negotiations take place outside the public view, so additional 
sources of information are needed to get a complete view (McPherson 2003, xv). To find the 
newspaper articles, I used the Eureka.cc news retriever. This contains more than 13 950 sources 
and full-text coverage of over ten newspapers from Newfoundland and Labrador. I also used 
ProQuest’s Canadian Newsstream database, which offers access to the full text of over 190 
Canadian newspapers. In addition, I searched Nunatsiaq News’ online database to find detailed 
information about the Nunavik case 12. There is thus a high degree of diversity in the newspaper 
sources.  
In order to gain more information, I decided to go on a two-week fieldwork to Canada in June 
2017. I gathered primary and secondary material from the national collection in the Grande 
Bibliothéque in Montreal and from the Labrador Institute in Happy Valley-Goose Bay. This 
allowed me to search through government publications, conference summaries, and other 
documents not found elsewhere. In addition, I sought to contact people who were involved in 
                                                 
12 Weekly newspaper based in Iqaluit, Nunavut serving Nunavut and the Nunavik region.  
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the negotiation process in order to conduct semi-structured interviews. The interviewees were 
identified by consulting public documents, published sources and newspaper articles. The 
initial focus was on establishing a list of the different negotiating teams, the senior bureaucrats 
and lead negotiators. One initial problem was finding the contact information of the people 
involved. 12 years have passed since the ratification of the Labrador Inuit Land Claims 
Agreement, and six years since the failed ratification of the Nunavik Final Agreement. Many 
of the people involved have switched jobs, retired or otherwise become less available.  
Another problem was the willingness of some potential interviewees to be interviewed. This 
was especially true for the case of Nunavik, where several informants either did not respond to 
my requests or did not want to participate for a variety of reasons. I ended up with six 
respondents, which includes representatives for the federal, provincial and the two Aboriginal 
groups.13 Four of them were involved in the negotiations for self-government in Nunavik, while 
the other two were involved in Nunatsiavut. In the case of Nunavik, I interviewed the two 
different lead negotiators representing the federal government, who between them have been 
involved in the whole duration of the negotiation process. I interviewed one representative of 
the Inuit party and one representative of the provincial government, who both wished to remain 
anonymous.   
In the case of Nunatsiavut, I interviewed the lead negotiator for the Labrador Inuit Association, 
who had been involved in the negotiations from beginning to end. I also met with a 
representative of the federal government, who will remain anonymous.14 These interviews 
allowed me to acquire information and knowledge about the two negotiation processes that is 
not available through other sources. Even with the limited amount of informants, I am confident 
that the sources of information, including interviews, newspaper articles, meeting minutes, 
government documents and relevant academic work will provide valuable insight into the 
mechanisms that caused the different outcomes between Nunavik and Nunatsiavut,  
4.3 Case selection 
In a comparative perspective, research on indigenous self-governance is a tricky matter. Not 
only are self-government agreements tailor fitted to the specific Aboriginal groups that are 
doing the negotiating, but at this point in time, there are very few completed stand-alone self-
                                                 
13 See Appendix 1 for a list of interviews, and Appendix 2 for the interview guide. 
14 Alcantara’s (2008) research on comprehensive land claims agreements in Canada include the case of 
Nunatsiavut and a series of interviews with informants relevant to this thesis.  
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government agreements.  At the time of writing, Nunatsiavut and Nunavut are the only Inuit 
regions that have completed a self-government agreement, both as a part of a comprehensive 
land claim agreement. Nunavik completed their Comprehensive Land Claims (CLC) agreement 
in 1976, and failed to ratify the 2011 self-government agreement. The Inuit in the Inuvialuit 
Settlement Region completed a CLC in 1984, and have since been negotiating a self-
government agreement and are expected to reach a final agreement in the near future.  
Since this is the case, I have to choose the cases that are best suited for comparison. I seek cases 
that share the maximal amount of common characteristics and the minimal amount of not share 
characteristics.  In order to assure that there is variation in the dependent variable, the outcome, 
it is imperative to include a negative case, so Nunavik is a given. For my second case, there are 
several options. The ideal option is a case that has completed a CLC without self-government 
provisions, then completed a stand-alone regional self-government agreement, and is situated 
within a province. There are, unfortunately, no cases that fit this description, but there are some 
that come close. Nunavut, which completed a CLC with self-government provisions in 1999, 
is a viable option. However, it differs from Nunavik in several important ways. Firstly, the 
Nunavut Land Claim Agreement (NLCA) led to the formation of a new public federal 
jurisdiction, Nunavut Territory, where Nunavik is a region in an already existing federal 
jurisdiction, Quebec. Secondly, the NLCA was a result of negotiations between Inuit 
representatives, the Northwest Territories and Canada. Negotiations with a Canadian territory 
are assumed to differ from those with a province (see Wilson 2008; Alcantara and Davidson 
2015).  
Another possible second case is the Deline Self-Government Agreement, which was completed 
in September 2016. Like with the Inuit in Nunavik, this is a stand-alone self-government 
agreement completed after a CLC. Unlike the Nunavik case, it is a community based self-
government agreement, and not a region based agreement. Deline has a population of 472, 
where 88 percent is North American Indian and only 3 percent is Inuit,  and a land area of 
approximately 80 km2 (Statistics Canada, 2011). This is a big contrast to Nunavik's land area 
500 000 km2 and 12 000 inhabitants. For those reasons alone, I find a Deline and Nunavik to 
be unfit for comparison 
A third option is the Inuvialuit in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR). As mentioned earlier, 
the Inuvialuit finished their CLC in 1984, and the Inuvialuit Final Agreement did not include 
self-government provisions. The negotiations for self-government have been ongoing since the 
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mid-1990s, but they have yet to conclude negotiations, which is my biggest concern in 
including it in my analysis. Apart from being located in a territory and not a province, this 
potential second case ticks off several of the right boxes: a predominantly Inuit population and 
a potential region based self-government agreement. However, they still have to compose a 
final agreement, which then is subject to a region-wide referendum, and it was at this stage that 
the Nunavik final agreement failed. I cannot justify including the Inuvialuit at this point in time, 
but it is an interesting case for future research.  
Nunatsiavut in Labrador is therefore the case that is best suited for comparison. While they 
gained self-government as a part of a land claims Agreement, they do share several traits with 
the Nunavik Inuit. First, the majority of the inhabitants are Inuit. Second, Nunatsiavut is located 
within a region and they negotiated for a regional self-government. Even though they did gain 
self-government powers through a land claims agreement, these processes are relatively similar 
and I feel confident in including the case in my thesis.  
Map 4.1: The regions of Nunavik and Nunatsiavut.  
 




4.3.1 Nunavik: An overview 
The Inuit and their predecessors have lived in Arctic Quebec for more than 3500 years, evident 
by the Dorset and pre-Dorset sites found along the Nunavik coast. At the time of the first 
encounter with white people in the late 16th century, the Inuit lived in bands composed of two 
to five families. The most populated area of Nunavik was north in the Ungava Peninsula, where 
food was abundant, and they would seldom venture south of the three line because of potential 
conflicts with Indians (Vick-Westgate 2002, 25). The European presence was sporadic this 
early on, and it was not until the 19th and early 20th century that trading posts were established 
in some parts of the region. Except for a few independent trading companies, it was the English 
Hudson's Bay Company and the French Révillon Frères who established the bulk of the trading 
posts in Nunavik during the 19th century. Fur trading became a major source of income and a 
means for the Inuit in acquiring vital commodities, but also a source of diseases and alcohol 
(AANDC 2006, 3).  
In addition to contact with fur traders and whalers, there were some attempts to evangelize the 
area. The Jesuits took part in some expeditions to the Hudson Bay in the 17th century and the 
Moravians established missions by the Labrador coast, but it was not until 1876 that the first 
mission in northern Quebec was established. "Missionaries ended up being respected as 
important providers for the community. Their paternalism toward the Inuit had of course a 
practical aim. They were trying to integrate into the community and thereby attract converts" 
(Hervé 2017a, 6). The missionaries were also a provider of education in the area, but since most 
of the Inuit were still pursuing a nomadic lifestyle, mission schools operated on an irregular 
basis. Federal authorities provided education from 1949 until the province took over in 1963 
(Kativik School Board, n.d) 
It was the Hudson Bay Company, missionaries and later the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
that was the main non-Inuit presences in Nunavik up until the end of the 1940s. Quarreling 
between the federal and provincial government was settled in a Supreme Court case in 1939, 
which ruled that the Inuit should be under federal jurisdiction. The Department of Northern 
Affairs and National Resources was created in 1953 and took over the responsibility of 
administering Arctic regions. The federal government encouraged the Inuit to try a more 
sedentary lifestyle and give up their nomadic ways by introducing several housing programs in 
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the early 1960s, with the goal of providing every Inuit family with a house by the early 1970s 
(Hervé 2017a, 8).  
In the 1960s, Quebec challenged the federal government's dominance in Northern Quebec and 
initiated negotiations in order to take over the responsibilities in the north. Quebec realized the 
economic potential in the region and that any attempt of sovereignty was dependent on full 
control of the northern parts of its province. The Inuit were not convinced that a Quebec 
takeover in the region was to their best interest, as they considered the provincial government 
to be less wealthy and influential. In addition, the Inuit were more attached to English and 
Anglicanism, and the Quebec was associated with French and Roman Catholicism (Hervé 
2017a, 11).   
The sedentarization of the Nunavimmiut was almost complete by the late 1960s, and 
government villages have now become the centers of residential life. As a result of this, the 
economic structure of the region changed drastically, going from hunting and fishing to a wage 
economy (Kishigami 2000, 175). As of 2011, only 0,2 percent of the Inuit labor force is 
employed in the agriculture, forestry or fishing and hunting industry, and the main industry 
providing jobs in the region are public administration, education and health care, which are 
employing almost 60 percent of the aboriginal working population (Statistics Canada 2011). 
The mining sector is also a big provider of jobs in Nunavik, providing over 1000 jobs, but only 
15 percent of them are employed by Inuit workers (Parnasimautik 2015, 123)  
Nunavik is a part of the arctic world, and is made up of the Kativik region, covering 
approximately 500 000 km2 north of the 55th parallel, as well as the Nunavik Marine Region, 
covering approximately 265 000 km2 of offshore areas. Most of the Inuit inhabit the coastal 
areas, living in fourteen communities ranging in size from 200 to 2400. There are no roads 
connecting the different communities, and the inhabitants are relying on air transportation and 
summer sealift for non-perishable foods and supplies.  
Nunavik has a population of 12 090, where 89 percent are Inuit. The population is extremely 
young, with 65,9 percent of the Inuit under the age of 30 and 36 percent under the age of 14. 
Social problems as teen pregnancy and suicide are much more prevalent in Nunavik than the 
rest of Quebec. The teen pregnancy rate is four times higher among girls aged 14 to 17 than the 
rest of the province, while the suicide rate for Inuit aged 20-24 is 23 times higher than the rest 
of the province; for Inuit aged 15-19 it is 56 times higher (Lawrence, 2010). The cost of food 
and household items are 52 percent and 97 percent higher than elsewhere in Quebec, 
37 
 
respectively. Life expectancy is approximately 14 years less than the rest of the province, and 
37,5 percent of Inuit households live in poverty (Parnasimautik 2015, 8).  
When the provincial government in Quebec announced the plans for the construction of a series 
of hydroelectric power stations on the La Grande River in northwestern Quebec in 1971, it 
created dissatisfaction with the indigenous people in the area. The development of the project 
would reap great economic benefits to the province, but at the same time lead to big changes 
to traditional lands and water streams, which in turn would affect the local indigenous 
population. The case went to court and ended in the James Bay and Northern Quebec 
Agreement (JBNQA). The Inuit in Nunavik received 8 151 km2 category I lands, 81 596 km2 
of category II lands, while one million square kilometers are identified as category III lands15. 
In addition the Nunavik Inuit received a monetary compensation of $91 million (1975$) 
(AANDC 2016).  
The Makivik Corporation was responsible for managing the financial compensation from the 
JBNQA on behalf of the Inuit beneficiaries, and is the primary political representative of the 
Inuit beneficiaries. Together with Makivik, three regional public administrations were created: 
the Kativik Regional Government (KRG), the Kativik School Board (KSB) and the Nunavik 
Board of Health and Social Services (NBHSS), which would provide a level of administrative 
autonomy the region. These three administrations are still in place, and it constitutes a very 
fragmented form of government, as each administration is responsible to its parent Quebec 
department, and there is very little coordination between them16. Supporters of a more extensive 
form of self-government rejected this form of limited autonomy and created a dissident 
organization called Inuit Tungavingat Nunamini (ITN) (Rodon & Grey 2008, 4). 
Along with ITN, the organizations stemming from JBNQA created a joint working group to 
draft a consultation report on Inuit self-government, which tabled two proposals for future self-
government.  The first proposal was that a constitutional committee should be elected to 
develop a strategy for further autonomy. This committee would be funded by voluntary taxes, 
establishing it as a grassroots democratic initiative. The second proposal was that the committee 
should be constituted of representatives of the different Inuit organizations, and funded by those 
                                                 
15 Category I: lands allocated to the Inuit for their exclusive use, in and around the communities where they 
normally reside and where they will have self-administration  
Category II: lands where the Inuit will have exclusive hunting, fishing and trapping rights, but no special right of 
occupancy.  
Category III: Quebec public lands where the Inuit have special rights to harvest certain species. 
16 This governance structure, with three public government bodies (KRG, KSB and NBHSS) along with a strong 
non-governmental actor (Makivik), constitutes multilevel governance as described in chapter three.  
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same organizations. However, no agreement was reached, and the Inuit requested a referendum. 
When the people of Nunavik decided in 1987, they went with the first proposal, and the 
proponents of the second proposal were elected to sit in the committee. “To some degree, this 
ensured the end of the dissension, since the two camps could both claim victory and admit 
defeat” (Rodon & Grey 2008, 5) 
With the committee in place, the Inuit could now start drafting a proposal for a constitution. 
The Nunavik constitutional committee visited all the Inuit communities, and was able to draft 
a proposal for the self-government negotiations, which was accepted in a referendum in 1991, 
Nunavik’s third referendum since 1975. With the Inuit united behind a single proposal, they 
could now enter into self-government negotiations with the federal and provincial government. 
The drafted constitution proposed the creation of a public regional government. In the mid-
1990s, the negotiations took a backseat to Quebec’s second sovereignty referendum in 1995. 
The Inuit of Nunavik, however, decided to arrange their own referendum, where 96 percent 
voted in favor of separating from Quebec and remaining a part of Canada in the case of Quebec 
sovereignty.  
As history has it, Quebec remained a part of Canada, and elected a new premier in 1996. The 
negotiations could once again continue, but with new participants at the table it had to start 
from scratch. In order to determine the framework of the system of government, the three 
parties of the negotiation created the Nunavik Commission, a trilateral body with representation 
from Canada, Quebec and Nunavik. The goal of the commission was to “identify the required 
means to establish a form of public government that can meet the needs of a northern 
community while operating within federal and provincial jurisdictions” (Dufour & Tremblay, 
2001, 1). The commission travelled to all the different Inuit communities in Nunavik for public 
consultations in a process that lasted nearly 17 months and ended in March 2001. The 
recommendations stemming from the Nunavik Commission formed the basis of the ensuing 
self-government negotiations. On December 5, 2007, Makivik, the Government of Quebec and 
Canada signed an Agreement-in-Principle (AIP) setting out the parameters for the negotiation 
of a final agreement.  
A final agreement between the Inuit of Nunavik, as represented by Makivik, the government 
of Quebec and Canada was reached in January of 2011. The objective of the agreement was “to 
provide for the creation and continued existence of the NRG (Nunavik Regional Government) 
for all residents of Nunavik” (NRGFA, 2011, 3). The agreement was a two-phased process, 
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where phase one is an amalgamation of the three public administrations into a unified entity, 
the NRG. All the existing powers and responsibilities of KRG, KSB and NRBHSS would be 
transferred to the NRG. The NRG was to be composed of (1) the Nunavik Assembly, the 
legislative branch, constituted of elected representatives. (2) The Executive Council, who is 
responsible for implementing the decisions of the Nunavik Assembly, and composed of five 
elected members. (3) The Administration of the NRG, who shall replace the administrations of 
KRG, KSB and NRBHSS and assume all their duties and functions.  
Phase two was subject to NRG obtaining the necessary authorities and “undertaking subsequent 
negotiations of a supplementary agreement or supplementary agreements which could provide, 
as the case may be, new powers to the NRG” (NRGFA 2011, 25). The Nunavik Regional 
Government Final Agreement was voted down in a region-wide referendum in April 2011. The 
approval of the referendum was conditional upon a majority of the votes being in favor of the 
agreement and that this majority represents at least 25 percent plus one of all the electors 
qualified to vote.  
4.3.2 Nunatsiavut: An overview 
The Thule people arrived in Labrador in about AD 1450, a century after they expanded to 
Nunavik (McMillan & Yellowhorn 2004, 286). Traditionally, the typical winter Labrador Inuit 
household was "comprised of multiple closely-related nuclear families consisting of a father 
and his married sons" (Arendt 2011, 50). The Inuit were constantly on the move throughout the 
year and hunted game such as caribou and porcupine during the summer months and walrus, 
seal and other sea mammals during the winter (Dorais 2002, 135; Pedersen, 2006).  
The Inuit of Labrador first encountered Europeans in the form of Basque whalers along the 
southern Labrador coast, who established whaling stations in the area in the mid-16th century 
(Barkham 1984, 517). The actual extent of the Basque-Inuit connection is unknown, but 
stratigraphic evidence does suggest that "contact between Inuit and Basque could have been at 
the very least a cordial one and instrumental in the Basque whaling enterprises" (Arendt 2011, 
78). Increasing competition, southward movement of the Inuit population and piracy led to the 
total disintegration of Basque whaling in the area by 1632 (Barkham 1384, 518). They were 
quickly replace by French and English whalers and fishermen, which eventually led to 
increased contact and trading with the Inuit (Alcantara 2008, 34).  
In 1769, Moravian missionaries, a protestant group based in Germany, were granted permission 
to establish missions in Labrador. Before establishing the mission, the Moravians sought verbal 
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permission from local Inuit to purchase the land in exchange for gifts such as fishing hooks 
(Arendt 2011, 121). They established their first mission in Nain in 1771 and became the first 
Europeans to establish a permanent settlement in the area. In order to spread the gospel to more 
than Inuit visiting Nain in the summer to fish, they established missions north of Nain, in Okak, 
and south, in Agvituk, quickly renamed Hopedale, by 1782. The Moravians struggled to make 
at an immediate impact on the Inuit, as they were hesitant to give up their traditional Inuit 
religion in exchange for Christian norms and values, but as more and more Inuit decided to live 
near and work with the Moravians, new cultural features and Christian norms were incorporated 
into the Inuit routine (ibid, 148-250).  
Moravian trading posts in Inuit communities meant that the Inuit no longer needed to travel 
south to trade and provided them with immediate access to European goods and services. "Most 
of the Inuit eventually converted to Christianity and abandoned their nomadic, season-centered 
living habits to settle in the permanent Moravian mission-centered communities" (Alcantara 
2008, 35). The move from a nomadic lifestyle to a more sedentary life was almost complete by 
the end of the 19th century, and happened much earlier than it did with their Inuit neighbors to 
the west.  
During the 19th and 20th centuries, the Inuit became more dependent on a market economy and 
adopted new technology to compete in natural resources industries such as cod and salmon 
fishing, seal trapping and fox trapping (Brice-Bennett 1997). The construction of a military air 
base near Happy Valley-Goose Bay in 1942 and several radar sites along the coast, gave the 
Inuit an opportunity to enter into wage employment. The confederation of Newfoundland and 
Labrador with Canada in 1949 led to the province receiving funds to administrate the 
Aboriginal peoples in the province. The funding was used by the province to further assimilate 
the Inuit, and they quickly closed the two northern missions in Nutak and Hebron in 1956 and 
1959, respectively. The official reason for the relocation was to provide the Nutak and Hebron 
Inuit with a higher standard of living through social services that would be available in larger 
communities (Brice-Bennett 2017, 176). The relocated Inuit struggled to make a living further 
south as they competed for resources with local fishers and hunters that had prior customary 
harvesting rights, and left many dependent on social welfare. Their poverty combined with their 
lack of understanding of the English language, unusual dialect of Inuktitut and cultural 
preference for seal set them apart from other community members, which in turn led to alcohol 
abuse and violent attacks within households (Ibid, 151). By the end of the twentieth century, 
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"almost all Inuit were Christianized, educated in English schools, and could speak the English 
language (Alcantara 2008, 37).  
Nunatsiavut has a total population of 2 617, where the Inuit represent 90 percent. As in other 
Arctic regions, the population is young. In 2011, 44 percent of Inuit in Nunatsiavut were under 
the age of 25, and the median age was 28,7. The suicide rate in the region is at an alarming rate 
of 275,3 per 100,000 in the period 2009-2013, higher than it is at any other Canadian Inuit 
region, and about 25 times higher than the national average of 11,3 (Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami). 
This figure should of course be considered with caution as we are dealing with a relatively 
small population. 42 percent of Inuit aged 25 and over in the region had experienced food 
insecurity in the last twelve months according to Aboriginal Peoples Survey 2012. In terms of 
language preservation, 25 percent of Inuit in Nunatsiavut reported the ability to conduct a 
conversation in Inuktitut, which is among the lowest percentage of the Inuit regions (Statistics 
Canada 2016).  
In terms of educational attainment, 43 percent of the Inuit population has no certificate, diploma 
or degree, 25 percent reports having a high school diploma and 33 percent reports having a 
postsecondary certificate, diploma or degree, of which 80 percent is either apprenticeship or 
non-university diploma. In terms of employment, the region has an unemployment rate of 34,7 
percent and the median income is $19,465, which is substantially lower than the provincial and 
national level (respectively, 14,7 percent and 8,1 percent, and $27, 170 and $30, 180) (Statistics 
Canada 2011).  
It was not until 1980 that the provincial government accepted the Inuit claim for negotiations. 
This happened after Brian Peckford took over as premier after Frank Moores. This was 
important because Peckford was more open to recognizing Inuit claims than his predecessor. 
Even though there was interest from the provincial leadership and the LIA, the negotiations did 
not begin until 1985, because of a federal policy that restricted the amount of active negotiations 
to six. When the Inuvialuit Inuit settled their land claim in 1984, it opened up a spot for the 
Inuit in Labrador.  However, the federal government suspended all of their negotiations in 1985 
as they were reviewing the comprehensive land claims policy. The suspension ended with the 
publication of the Coolican report in 1986, and the federal government made several changes 
to their policy in 1986. In a response, the province reviewed the report and the policy changes, 
and generated their own response, which they finished by October 1988. Even though the 
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province was unhappy about the lack of a cost-sharing agreement with the federal government, 
it was willing to enter into tripartite negotiations.  
The three parties agreed to a framework agreement in March 1990, after two months of 
negotiations. The negotiations for the agreement in principle would last for nine years. There 
were two main reasons for this. The first six years of negotiations were mainly about 
disagreements between the province and the federal government about cost sharing. The 
province was willing to cover costs that were under provincial jurisdiction, such as land and 
renewable and non-renewable resources, but it was under no obligation to provide money to 
the agreement. The federal government's stance was that the province was obligated to pay for 
some of the agreement, as it did not want to set a precedent for other provinces for cost sharing.  
Secondly, many of the interviewees from Alcantara's Negotiating the Deal pointed to the 
province's lack of experience in land claim negotiations, as this was their first AIP negotiation, 
and the province did not have the necessary experience and knowledge to broker a deal. In 
addition, there was a lack of political will at the provincial level. Even though the premier at 
the time wanted a deal, it was hardly a main priority, "partly because he did not believe in 
special recognition for collectives" (Alcantara 2008, 140). After six years of negotiations and 
one finished chapter on the AIP, two events really changed the pace of the negotiations. The 
discovery of nickel at Voisey's Bay created a mineral rush to the area. Voisey's Bay is located 
just south Nain, the administrative capital of Nunatsiavut, in an area that both the Inuit and the 
Innu had claimed. Both the provincial and the federal government were eager to speed up to 
the negotiations in order to start mineral extraction in the area.  
Once nickel was discovered in Voisey's Bay, the area was pulled off the negotiation table by 
the federal and provincial governments. The Inuit responded with a court injunction to stop the 
development.  Once again, the negotiations stalled, but a quick conclusion would now be to the 
advantage of all parties involved. For the first time, LIA, the provincial government and the 
federal government agreed to fast-track the negotiations, with intensive and frequent 
negotiation sessions. Still, not all of the issues could be resolved this way. It was during an 
eleven day negotiation session in October 1997 that the three parties finally resolved the issues 
that were of major contention, mainly land selection, revenue sharing, cost sharing and self-
government. From there on out, the process moved quickly to a completed AIP in 1999 and the 
ratification vote on the AIP in 2001.  
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The negotiations for the final agreement went on rather quickly, but there were still some issues 
left unresolved. The first one was that of land selection. The LIA provided a land selection 
proposal to the federal and provincial governments, which the provincial leadership was quite 
negative towards. Almost a decade earlier, the province had offered the Inuit several blocks of 
land, which the Inuit found to be unsatisfactory and rather wanted several large "ribbons" of 
land along the coastline of Labrador. The problem of land selection ended in a compromise, 
where the Inuit had to accept some of the land that they did not really want, and conceding 
some of the areas that they did want, while the province gave up on their "blocks of land", and 
went along with the "ribbons", therefore giving up more land than they initially wanted.  
The second unresolved issue during the final agreement negotiation was that of Voisey's Bay. 
The AIP stated the Voisey's Bay chapter would be negotiated during the final agreement, but 
Inco, the Canadian mining company, was ahead of schedule and both the governments were 
eager to move the project forward. Although it was determined in the AIP that the Voisey's Bay 
project should not commence before the completion of the final agreement, the Inuit succumbed 
to the pressure of the two governments, and the project started before a final agreement was 
concluded. The LIA felt comfortable doing so partly because of the Impacts and Benefits 
Agreement (IBA) that was agreed upon between LIA and Inco, and two separate agreements 
with the two levels of government, but also because there was an informal agreement between 
LIA leadership, the premier and the federal negotiator that a final agreement would be 
completed if the Voisey's Bay project moved forward (Alcantara 2008, 145).  
After this, I will examine the two negotiation processes in detail in order to identify the causal 






5. Analysis of the negotiation processes 
In order to identify the causal process observations (CPOs) and evaluating their effect on the 
outcome of the negotiations in Nunavik and Nunatsiavut, careful description of how the 
processes played out is imperative. This chapter focuses on the unfolding of significant events 
in the two cases, and characterizes the key steps in the processes leading up to the conclusion 
of the negotiations. The first section of this chapter describes the unfolding of the negotiation 
process in Nunavik and the central events and disagreements leading up to the failed 
referendum in 2011. The second section covers the negotiation process of the Labrador Inuit, 
characterizing the key moments leading up to the successful ratification of the Labrador Inuit 
Land Claims Agreement.  
5.1 The Nunavik Inuit road towards self-government 
In September 1997, Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard travelled to Nunavik, as the first Quebec 
government leader since 1984, in a visit that signaled the start of warmer relations between 
Nunavik and Quebec. During the preceding summer, there were intense debates about the 
partition of Quebec between Ottawa and Quebec, where the Minister of Intergovernmental 
Affairs Stéphane Dion stated: "You can't consider Canada divisible but the territory of Quebec 
sacred. If there are native groups, municipalities or regional municipalities who on an equally 
democratic basis decided they wanted to stay Canadian, you would have to talk to those people" 
(Young 1998, 354). The newly elected Premier of Quebec replied that Canada is divisible 
because Canada is not a real country (ibid). The visit to Nunavik, however, was neither about 
Quebec sovereignty nor partition, but about building a positive relationship with the region. 
The Premier signed three major agreements with the Kativik Regional Government assuring 
money to tourism, Inuit culture and the mining industry, in addition to having preliminary self-
government talks with the president of Makivik, Zebedee Nungak (George 1997). Bouchard 
agreed to reopen negotiations on the establishment of a public government institution north of 
the 55th parallel.  
This was a significant step in the right direction for the Nunavimmiut. Ever since the signing 
of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) they had been seeking more 
extensive self-government powers. However, there had been internal divisions regarding what 
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form self-government should take since the early 1970s (Rodon and Grey 2008, 4) 17. Indeed, 
one of the preconditions for further discussions of self-government with Quebec, as then-
premier René Lévesque explained during a 1983 parliamentary commission on Aboriginal 
rights, was that the Inuit needed to be united behind a common process (Nunavik Commission 
2001, 1). The Nunavimmiut eventually settled their disagreements through two referendums, 
in 1987 and 1991, which signaled to the provincial government that they had unified their 
approaches concerning autonomy.  
The Quebec government gave the Secrétariat aux affaires autochtones (SAA) the responsibility 
of setting up a joint task force along with Makivik in order to develop the political accord, that 
would serve as the foundation for the ensuing negotiations. The first meeting was in December 
that same year, and in April 1998, the Nunavik Inuit announced that they were close to finishing 
a deal that would establish a Nunavik Commission that would have the mandate to design a 
more powerful territorial government (Nunatsiaq News 1998). Just months later in June, there 
were reports that the negotiations had stalled over the wording of two sections of the accord, 
and could be delayed for months as a result. The draft accord was now in its seventh version 
(George 1998). The parties were not able to close the deal before summer and the talks were 
further delayed.  
The resigning of Makivik president Nungak in September, the election of new Makivik 
president Pita Aatami, the provincial election in November and an avalanche in the northern 
city of Kangiqsualujjuaq on New Year’s Day leaving nine dead contributed to the further delay 
of negotiations (George 1999a). In May 1999, the wording of the agreement was determined, 
as the 15th version of the draft struck the words “commitment”, “assembly” and “elected 
government” from the text. Quebec officials were however increasingly worried over the level 
of autonomy the accord seemed to offer Nunavik and fearful of making promises about an 
eventual government before the proposed commission had made their recommendations 
(George 1999b). The question of funding for the commission was still not resolved. Quebec 
wanted to split the bill equally in three, between Quebec, the federal government and Makivik. 
Makivik was willing to contribute money but did not believe it was fair that an organization 
that was ethnically based and represented only the Nunavik Inuit should pay for the 
development of a public government that would represent all the inhabitants of Nunavik.  
                                                 
17 Two competing visions emerged: A more radical grassroots organization centered on the co-op movement 
calling for the creation of an Inuit government, and a more pragmatic group calling for some administrative 
autonomy with a continued federal presence.  
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In July that same year, Indian Affairs Minister Jane Stewart commented on the state of the 
political accord by saying that the federal government has been ready for 10 months to sign the 
document, but that the province had “been dilly-dallying and deciding whether they’re in or 
whether they’re out” (George 1999c). Eventually the three parties signed the accord on 
November 5. By signing the accord, the parties agreed to establish a “Nunavik Commission 
with the mandate to develop a timetable, plan of action, and recommendations for the structure, 
operations and powers of a government in Nunavik” (SAA 1999). The commission would be 
co-chaired by one Inuit representative and one from Quebec, and have six additional members, 
two from each party.  
The commission would develop recommendations that should define the powers, jurisdictions, 
responsibilities and competencies of a Nunavik Government, as well as the election process 
and the structure of what would be the Nunavik Government. It would also be responsible for 
making recommendations on the relationship between governments, such as the relationship 
between Nunavik and Quebec, and Nunavik and Canada. They would also make 
recommendations on measures to promote and enhance the Inuit culture in Nunavik, including 
the use of Inuktitut in the Nunavik Government 
The Nunavik Accord introduced 12 overriding principles that the commission should respect 
in their work. Amongst other things, it stated that any new government would be non-ethnic in 
nature and open to all residents of Nunavik, which was a precondition for the Quebec 
Government. While there were some discussions about the issue and some Inuit leaders that 
wanted an ethnic form of government, Quebec had always had the position that any regional 
government created by the Quebec Government and under the framework and laws of the 
Quebec Government had to be homogenous with the Quebec Government (Interview C 2017). 
This issue was also brought up by the minister of Native Affairs as he stated that he was 
“particularly pleased with the fact that the proposed Nunavik government will be non-ethnic in 
nature” (Makivik 1999). Aatami admitted that the accord was not ideal, but that it was a 
document of compromise that will finally permit self-government negotiations to proceed 
(George 1999d). The accord also stated that the government “may be innovative in nature” and 
respect the arctic character of Nunavik.18  
                                                 
18 The need to be innovative stems from the fact that an autonomous form of public government within a 
province does not yet exist within Quebec or any other provincial jurisdiction in Canada. 
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The Nunavik Commission started its work on November 25, 1999. According to the accord, 
the commission had a timetable of 8 months, which could be extended with consent of the 
parties. The Commission had a three-phase approach. First, the Commission visited every 
community in Nunavik and held public hearings, spoke with secondary school students and 
local elected officials. Second, the Commission held a series of meetings with officials from 
provincial and federal departments involved in Nunavik-related issues, as well as officials from 
Greenland and Nunavut. In the last phase, the commission established various working groups 
in specific issues. The Commission finally tabled their recommendations in March 2001 
(Amiqqaaluta 2001, 2) 
The work of the Commission was not without controversy, as two of the commissioners refused 
to sign the document. Annie Popert of the Nunavik Party19 claimed in a letter to the President 
of the Kativik School Board in February 2001 that the Commission had “continuously violated 
the spirit and letter of the Political Accord” (KSB v. Makvik 2004, 4). She also accused the 
commission of “ignoring Inuit concerns and engaging in undemocratic practices to stifle debate 
about the right of Quebec Inuit to self-determination” (Bell 2001). At this point, the 
Commission had finished making their recommendations, but according to Popert, she had 
voiced her complaints about the process numerous times before, but was shot down every time. 
One of the quarrels between Popert and the Quebec-appointed André Binette centered on 
Quebec separatism and the future of Nunavik if Quebec secedes from Canada. Binette went as 
far as writing to all the commissioners that he had “informed the government of Quebec that 
one of the Inuit members of the Commission was obstructing the work of the Commission and 
was hostile to Quebec” (George 2001).  
The clash between Popert and Binette was unwelcome news for all parties. Neither the Inuit 
co-chairman of the commission, Harry Tulugak, nor Makivik president, Pita Aatami, condoned 
that Popert went public with her concerns about the Commission’s report, and would go ahead 
with their recommendations despite this (George 2001b). At the time, the commission was not 
going anywhere and there were concerns that the commission might collapse (Savoie 2017). 
The federal negotiator, Donat Savoie, suggested that the two representatives from the federal 
government should take control of the government. According to the deputy minister of the 
Secrétariat aux affaires autochtones (SAA), “Binette decided that he had his own mandate, he 
didn’t respect the framework in which we were working, so at one point he decided that it was 
                                                 
19 The party representing Nunavik in the negotiations, composed of Makivik, KRG, KSB, and NRBHSS.  
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‘his plan’ or nothing” (Interview C 2017). The Nunavik Commission getting only 6 of 8 
signatures could be seen as problematic as the Political Accord stated that “the 
recommendations tabled by the Commission shall be subject to a consensus from all its 
members” (Political Accord 1999). 
After the report was tabled at the Makivik annual general meeting in April 2001, dissatisfaction 
in the Kativik School Board (KSB) grew. Members of the council of commissioners at KSB 
saw the document as flawed as there was no consensus, it did not address the secession issue, 
lacked a funding plan for education and it did not include their own recommendations (KSB 
2001a, 5-7). KSB frequently discussed the Commission Report leading up to the Nunavik 
Government Conference, where the different regional organizations met along with 
representatives of all Nunavik communities to discuss a possible Nunavik government. KSB 
went into the conference with a clear stance that they did support self-government, but are not 
happy with the report and stressed the need for consensus. Despite KSB’s concern, the Nunavik 
Government Conference passed a resolution to authorize Makivik, on behalf of the Nunavik 
Party, to enter into self-government negotiations based, but not limited to, the recommendations 
and final report of the Nunavik Commission with a vote of 38 against 12 (Makivik 2002, 31).  
In the aftermath of the conference, in a letter to Makivik, KSB reiterated their concerns 
regarding the report and its lack of consensus, and also stated the resolution passed in the 
Nunavik Government Conference was illegitimate “because they had been voted on by all the 
individuals present, whereas the five constituent members of the Nunavik Party should have 
had one vote each” (KSB v. Makivik 2004, 5). KSB discussed the means of resolving their 
dispute with Makivik and came up with three possibilities: negotiation, mediation or 
litigation20. They passed a resolution on November 6 where they maintained their position that 
there should be no negotiations with Quebec and Canada until the Commission meets with 
KSB, the Commission fulfills its mandate and there is a consensus (KSB 2001b, 6-12). In order 
to prevent the negotiations to continue, they mandated their legal counsel to take any 
appropriate legal action that may be acquired.  
Makivik and the rest of the Nunavik Party, excluding KSB, started negotiating for self-
government based on the recommendations of the Nunavik Commission and relied heavily on 
it. It laid the groundwork for the ensuing negotiations, and could encompass up to 85 percent 
                                                 
20 Negotiations required two parties that are willing to negotiate. Mediation requires the same, but includes a 
neutral third party. Litigation would mean taking Makivik to court in order to force Makivik to negotiate. 
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of certain sections of the agreement, such as the creation of the Nunavik Assembly, which was 
based on a recommendation from the Nunavik Commission (Savoie 2017). On November 20 
2001, the KSB sought an injunction against these self-government talks (George 2001c). They 
were however willing to drop the court case if Makivik agreed to include what they wanted in 
the Commission Report (KSB 2002a, 4-7). Makivik invited KSB to name people that would 
negotiate on behalf of the Nunavik Party and later on to name members to an Advisory and 
Technical Support Committee, but declined on the grounds that “the exercise of naming 
negotiators at this stage would be premature and improper since the so-called Nunavik 
Commission Report and the Kuujjuaq resolution of October 11 are not legitimate” (KSB v 
Makivik 2004, 6).  
Makivik and KSB met two times in the summer of 2002 in order to sort out their differences, 
with the first meeting reported to go well, but the second did not go anywhere and lasted less 
than an hour. KSB felt that issues raised in the first meeting went unaddressed and that Makivik 
did not study their documents or consider their concerns. Makivik failed to constructively 
participate in these meetings, and KSB concluded that there was nothing to be gained by 
continuing to have such meetings and that Makivik was not open to alternative dispute 
resolution (KSB 2002b, 4-6). KSB passed a resolution on August 27 2002, where the Council 
of Commissioners “vigorously confirm its position as expressed in resolution no. 2002-02/06 
and confirm the mandate to its legal counsel to take any appropriate legal action that may be 
required, including a request before the Quebec Superior Court for declaratory judgment and a 
Court injunction, including interlocutory injunction” (ibid).  
KSB claimed they had popular support for legal action based on the recent election of 
commissioners in which six of the seven school board commissioners won reelection (Nelson 
2002b). In addition, two prominent opponents of the court action were defeated. Harry Tulugak, 
Makivik negotiator, lost his election bid in Kuujuaq and dismissed the notion that this election 
reflected popular sentiment towards KSB’s legal action. Claiming the election results as 
support for legal action, however, would be a stretch at best, evident by its voter turnout of 33 
percent. One would have a better case for arguing for popular support against the legal action 
based on Pita Aatami’s reelection as Makivik President a couple of months later, with a voter 
turnout of 53 percent (Makivik 2003a, 26).  
In a letter to Nunatsiaq News dated November 22 2002, Makivik president Pita Aatami, 
commented on the legal fight to stop the Nunavik Government negotiations and the supposed 
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illegitimacy of Makivik as a negotiator. He stated that Makivik “has never relinquished any of 
its mandates or rights as the Inuit party to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement” 
(Nunatsiaq News 2002b). Makivik’s mandate and rights clearly allows it to enter into 
negotiations on self-government in Nunavik, and the idea that KSB, a non-ethnic body created 
by provincial legislation, has gained a veto on the question of Inuit governance is alarming, 
according to Aatami.  
KSB failed to win an immediate freeze to the self-government negotiations in November 2002, 
as the Quebec Superior Court did not grant the school board a safeguard order. With this 
verdict, the court allowed the Nunavik Party to continue the self-government negotiations. 
However, the court did schedule preliminary hearings for a future injunction case, which if 
granted, could retroactively nullify the agreement even after it was completed (Nelson 2002a). 
While Makivik proceeded with their negotiations, the school board continued with their 
skepticism towards the framework agreement and the legitimacy of the negotiations. In 
February 2003, they called the impending framework agreement futile and accused Makivik of 
bullying (Nunatsiaq News 2003). Both the presidents of Makivik and KSB spoke on local radio 
in order to sway public opinion to their side of the debate. Aatami refuted the claims that 
Makivik were bullies and reassured that Makivik was given the mandate to conduct 
negotiations for self-government through the Nunavik Government Conference (Nelson 2003) 
While the discussion continued about Makivik’s legitimacy and role in the negotiations, the 
upcoming provincial election lead to further delays of framework ratification (Nelson 2003). 
The new liberal government honored the former Parti Quebcois government commitment to a 
new government for Nunavik and the framework agreement was signed June 26 2003. The 
purpose of the framework agreement was to:  
establish a formal process for negotiating, as a first phase, an Agreement-in- Principle 
and a Final Agreement on the amalgamation of the KRG, KSB, NRBHSS, KDRC and, 
if necessary, of other existing organizations, including their boards and councils, and 
all of their powers, responsibilities, roles, functions, authorities, assets, jurisdictions, 
competencies, obligations, resources, and privileges, into a single Unified Entity in 
Nunavik (Negotiation Framework Agreement 2003, 3) 
Moreover, the agreement establishes a second phase in the negotiations on the creation of a 
new form of government and to discuss the funding agreements with the two governments. The 
funding would take the form of block funding and would seek to consolidate all recurring 
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programs and funding provided to the organizations included in the supposed amalgamation 
(Negotiation Framework Agreement, 2003, 3-4). The framework agreement also repeatedly 
refers to the Inuit party as “Makivik” and not as “Nunavik Party”, which was the case in the 
Political Accord and in the “Negotiation Framework Agreement” of 1994, and one of the main 
reasons for the dissatisfaction of the KSB regarding the negotiations. The notion that Makivik 
and its president has authorization to sign a document on behalf of the school board on matters 
that affect the areas of KSB jurisdiction and its very existence, was illegal and contrary to the 
mandate given to Makivik, according to the school board (KSB 2003, 4-5).  
There were several reasons for doing the negotiations in two phases: (1) Doing a self-
government agreement with all provisions included is a very time-consuming affair, and at the 
time there was a fear that a change in government could scrap the whole process (Interview C 
2017). An amalgamation is quicker and there was already some power in those organizations 
and an existing infrastructure. (2) A two-phased approach would have an easier path through 
government, and there were concerns by Quebec politicians that the Inuit could not take more 
at this point and if they went too far, too quick and it crashed, it would take a long time before 
negotiations could re-start (Interview C 2017). The idea of the two-phased approach came from 
the Quebec government, but was something all parties agreed upon (Interview C 2017, Savoie 
2017, Interview A 2017, Budgell 2017).  
The signing of the framework agreement did very little to change KSB’s approach, as it passed 
a resolution that summer to once again confirm its position and the mandate given to its legal 
counsel (KSB 2003, 4-5). Makivik, on the other hand, took the position that as the Inuit party 
to the JBNQA, it created the KRG, KSB, NRBHSS and the KRDC. Therefore, Makivik could 
also change those institutions (Makivik 2003b, 25). In the wake of the framework agreement, 
Makivik began printing quarterly newsletters specifically to keep the public and the various 
government departments informed about the developments of the negotiation process (Makivik 
2004a, 22).  
In February 2004, the Quebec Superior Court rendered judgment and did not grant the 
interlocutory injunction to stop the negotiation process. KSB was unsuccessful in arguing that 
they would suffer “irreparable harm” if they were left out of the negotiations with Canada and 
Quebec, mainly because an amalgamation of the institutions was part of the agreed upon 
principles of the Political Accord (KSB v. Makivik 2004b, 11). With regard to KSB’s concerns 
about language and that Inuktitut would be seriously weakened if people were given the 
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freedom to choose the language of instruction for their children, the court found no evidence 
to support the claim that the Commission Report recommended such freedom of choice. “On 
the contrary, recommendation 1.29 provides a significant improvement of the position of 
Inuktitut in Nunavik” (ibid, 12).  
 KSB argued that the uncertainty regarding the School Board’s future was harming educational 
planning. The court stated that while that may be true, all change creates uncertainty, and that 
in itself is not a sufficient reason to halt the negotiations. The court was particular critical of 
KSB’s claim that they did not have the opportunity to participate in negotiations. Firstly, the 
Political Accord did not grant the individual institutions designated as the Nunavik Party the 
right to participate in any negotiation at all. Makivik is the only entity empowered to consent 
to change in the JBNQA. Secondly, KSB had repeatedly refused to participate in the negotiation 
process, first by refusing to submit names of potential negotiators and then by not participating 
in the Advisory and Technical Committee. “The injunction as formulated would put an end to 
all negotiations possibly for several years. The momentum for agreement could well be lost in 
the mean time (sic) and the hope for a Nunavik regional government once again postponed 
indefinitely” (KSB v. Makivik 2004, 16).  
After the verdict, Makivik issued a press release where they stated that they were pleased with 
the decision and that the invitation to the school commissioners to meet with the Makivik board 
was still open, and so was the invitation to participate in the Advisory and Technical Committee 
(Makivik 2004). KSB decided not to appeal the decision and sought to meet with Makivik and 
other members of the Nunavik Party to attempt to open a dialogue and explore the possibility 
of participating in the negotiation process and appointing a fourth negotiator to protect 
education’s interest. (KSB 2004, 8-9). Makivik refused to appoint a fourth negotiator, but 
welcomed KSB’s addition to the Advisory and Technical Committee.  
With KSB now more involved in the process, the Nunavik Party was seemingly more unified, 
which was one of the preconditions for starting self-government negotiations when then-
premier René Lévesque was confronted with the question during a parliamentary commission 
on Aboriginal rights in 1983. Negotiations for an agreement-in-principle (AIP) continued with 
input from all regional institutions, and by the summer of 2004 the AIP rolling draft was starting 
to look like a fairly complete document and was circulated to the various Nunavik organizations 
(Nunavik 01.03, 5-6).  
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In the fourth edition of the quarterly Nunavik newsletter, the three main institutions in Nunavik 
express their vision of a Nunavik Government. KRG sees “the advent of this new structure as 
desirable, necessary and even essential for the region’s development” (Makivik 2004b, 8). 
KRG has long understood that “as the phoenix, KRG must die so as to be reborn with a better 
structure, merged within the government of Nunavik, which powers shall be many and 
diversified” (ibid, 9). The Health Board’s vision for a new government was perhaps less 
grandiose, but none the less positive in spirit, as they saw the new government as a tool to bring 
people together and were hopeful of good cooperation between the different institutions (ibid, 
26-26). KSB agreed to the idea of amalgamation provided that the result was a new government 
with new powers, but the amalgamation described in the AIP was just putting the powers and 
budgets of the three organizations in one basket. The School Board believed that “there should 
be no possibility of confusion, that the Nunavimmiut clearly understand that what they will be 
voting on is not self-government, but a new form of administration” (ibid, 16). They held the 
position that Nunavik should negotiate new powers first, then amalgamate.  
The three Inuit negotiators responded to each of the organizations in the ensuing newsletter, 
and in the case of the KSB, “rectifying a number of wrong interpretations” (Makivik 2005, 13). 
They distanced themselves from the idea that the Nunavimmiut would vote for a new form of 
administration by stating that a government based on universal suffrage, accountability to the 
population and being responsible towards these constituents is much more than a simple 
administration.   
In a cabinet shuffle, Quebec premier Jean Charest named Geoffrey Kelley as the new minister 
of Native Affairs in February 2005. The new government intended to keep on working on all 
agreements signed by the previous government, and had a general commitment to move 
forward on self-government in Nunavik. The new minister expressed encouragement about the 
dropped opposition of the School Board, saying it is “always awkward when one part of the 
government takes another to court” (George 2005). The department of Native Affairs expected 
Nunavik to move slowly towards self-government because of tight finances and believed that 
this was not the time to commit millions to self-government re-organization. The Liberal 
government generally had a slow-track approach to self-government.  
As mentioned earlier, the negotiations for the AIP got off to a quick start, but the signing was 
severely delayed by outside events. The Nunavik Party hoped to have the AIP signed before 
the end of 2005, but the political climate at the federal level, in which a general election was 
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called as a result of a motion of no confidence against Prime Minister Martin, certainly played 
a role. In addition, legal questions arose from the Quebec Government which called for a 
meeting between the three parties’ legal counsel to review certain sections of the JBNQA 
(Nunavik Government 2007a). Another issue was the naming of the future government. The 
Inuit wanted to name their government “Nunavik Government”, but Quebec believed that the 
French word “gouvernement” had too much significance and were concerned with creating a 
third order of government (Interview A 2017). Quebec rather wished to name it 
“Administration régional du Nunavik”, and as a compromise they ended up with 
“Gouvernement du régional du Nunavik”  
In February 2007 the parties were ready to sign the AIP during Prime Minister Harper and 
Premier Charest’s visit to Kuujjuaq, but the meeting was postponed as Charest prepared to call 
a provincial election. This postponed the signing until after the election was held April 26 
(George 2007).  The meeting was eventually rescheduled to be held in August, when Charest, 
the newly appointed Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, Chuck Strahl and other 
representatives for Canada and Quebec visited Kuujjuaq. Even though no agreement was 
signed during the visit, Charest publicly announced that his government is in full support of the 
Nunavik Regional Government, and that the delay is not in the content, but rather in the process. 
The agreement was delayed in getting approval at the federal level, but Strahl indicated that the 
federal government was in full support of the agreement (Nunavik Government 2007b). The 
AIP was finally signed on December 5 2007.  
At this point, the agreement nearly contained 90 percent of the final agreement. The issues 
under negotiation for the final agreement mainly consisted of setting up the rules and 
procedures for the referendum, establishing the rights and obligations of the regional 
government, developing a dispute settlement mechanism and establishing a timetable for the 
implementation of the agreement (Savoie 2009, 177). One of the more contentious issues was 
the question of what kind of level of support was required for the agreement to pass. The federal 
requirement for this kind of agreement was a double majority. In other words, a majority of the 
population has to vote and a majority of that majority has to vote yes. This was contentious 
because it establishes a different standard than in an election or other referenda, but as this 
agreement was affecting the JBNQA and constitutionally protected rights, this was something 
the federal side held as a standard. It was controversial and contested by the Inuit, but it was 
something the Federal Government would not budge on (Budgell 2017).  
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By the early weeks of 2011, the three parties initialed the final agreement and participated in 
an information tour of all communities in Nunavik. It was at this stage that there appeared 
widespread questioning, doubt and fear in relation to the document (Budgell 2017, Interview 
A 2017). There were worries that the agreement did not advance Inuit aspirations far enough, 
and at the other end of the spectrum, that it was too much to handle (Budgell 2017). The Inuit 
questioned the reasoning for the vague language in the agreement in relation to the assurance 
of a second phase of negotiations, which stated that subsequent negotiations could provide new 
powers to the NRG. That part was deliberatively vague because “the agreement couldn’t dictate 
what powers a new institution might want to negotiate” (Rogers 2011c). At the same time, both 
the provincial and federal negotiators indicated a strong interest in the development of self-
governance in Nunavik (ibid). The information tour did not succeed in reaching out to the 
younger population, and was perhaps not getting a representative sample of the population 
(Rogers 2011a, Budgell 2017).  
It was during the information tour that the people of Nunavik connected very effectively over 
social media and started discussing the agreement; something the Inuit negotiator Harry 
Tulugak called “fear-mongering” (Rogers 2011d). The Facebook group Nunavik and the 
Nunavik Regional Government’s Final Agreement attracted over 1000 members, who were 
very active leading up to the referendum, with more than 1 100 posts and over 5 000 comments 
during the two months leading up to the referendum. Concerns about the extent of self-
government granted and the lack of language protection were voiced, as well as information 
that might have shown a lack of understanding of the agreement. On April 27, 66 percent of 
Inuit voters voted no to ratification, with a voter turnout of 54,5 percent. Those who rejected 
the agreement were in a majority in all of the 14 villages. All persons living within Nunavik 
had the right to vote, as well as those Inuit beneficiaries living outside of the region.   
5.2 The Labrador Inuit road to self-government 
The Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) submitted their land claim to the provincial and federal 
government in 1977. The federal government accepted the claim as establishing the basis of 
negotiation for Labrador Inuit land claims under the 1973 claims policy. However, the 
government of Newfoundland and Labrador initially rejected the claim. The Progressive 
Conservative government under the leadership of Premier Frank Moores refused to 
acknowledge the special recognition of any Aboriginal group in the province. Historically, the 
province had taken “the position that there was nothing to negotiate, that the Innu [and the 
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Inuit] had no more claim to land than other Newfoundland residents” (Backhouse and McRae 
2002, 41).  
On March 17, 1979, Brian Peckford overtook the leadership of the Progressive Conservative 
party after Moores’ retirement. This was an important victory for the Aboriginal peoples, as he 
was more open to recognizing Aboriginal rights. In October 1980, Peckford issued a “Statement 
on the Question of Native Land Claims in the Province”, which confirmed that the province 
would attempt to settle claims that were accepted by the federal government (Procter 2012, 
139). This policy was significant, but it did offer a very limited approach to land claims. One 
of the principal features of this announcement was that the provincial government required “a 
bilateral intergovernmental agreement with Canada regarding the roles and responsibilities of 
the two governments in relation to land claims prior to the commencement of negotiations” 
(Haysom 1992, 182). The policy was also limited due to the fact that Aboriginal rights were 
restricted to those concerning “culture and heritage” and negotiation was classified as 
affirmative action (Procter 2012, 140). The policy was not a recognition of inherent rights, but 
an effort from the province to engage Inuit in development.  
Although the mutual interest from all three parties was present, formal negotiations did not start 
until 1989. There were four primary reasons for this delay. In order to maximize the 
effectiveness of limited federal funds and resources, the federal government capped the number 
of active negotiations at six. The six that were granted a spot were usually land claims that the 
federal government viewed as highly likely to succeed, those in which the provincial 
government was willing to be involved and those where a settlement of claims in the disputed 
area was a priority (Haysom 1990). With the arbitrarily set number of six and the long period 
needed to settle a land claim, openings were few and far between. The primary work of LIA 
between 1981 and 1984 was getting in position to enter into negotiations if a slot should become 
available. This happened in June 1984 when the Inuit in the western arctic signed the Inuvialuit 
agreement, and therefore opening up a slot in the exclusive short list. Later that year the federal 
government invited the LIA to begin negotiations.  
In addition to this 3-year delay, the federal government suspended all its comprehensive land 
claims (CLC) negotiations in 1985 to review the land claims policy. The result of this review 
was the Coolican Report, which caused many important changes in the land claims policy. 
Shortly after, Newfoundland and Labrador announced that they were doing their own review 
of the Coolican Report and formulated their own response, a process that took a year to 
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complete (Haysom 1990). After this was completed, the province entered into bilateral 
negotiations with the federal government in order to reach an agreement on their respective 
responsibilities in relation to land claims. A tentative agreement, or Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), was reached at the officials’ level in 1987, and was accepted by the 
Newfoundland cabinet, only to be rejected by the federal government a year later (Haysom 
1992, 183).  
The provincial policy was restrictive in many respects, with the province’s refusal to provide 
any financial compensation to the claim beneficiaries being perhaps the most troubling (RCAP, 
vol 3). In addition, the provincial policy offered no sub-surface rights or revenue sharing. 
According to Veryan Haysom, legal adviser to the LIA: “The federal government appears to 
believe that the package of benefits available to claimant groups under the Newfoundland 
policy is so limited and restrictive that settlements will either not be possible or will lead to 
inordinate demands on the federal government” (Haysom 1992, 183). In spite of these 
differences between the province and the federal government, and the fact that they had not 
signed the MOU, the federal government announced in August 1988 that they would 
commence tripartite negotiations with the LIA.  
During the framework negotiations, both governments were working towards reaching an 
agreement on the MOU. The framework agreement was finished in March 1990, and signed 
November 30, 1990. The reason for the delay in ratification was the absence of an MOU, which 
was still at an impasse. After the signing, the federal cabinet gave the minister of Indian Affairs 
18 months to reach an agreement with the provincial government (Haysom 1992, 183). By 
November 1991, still no agreement had been made between the two governments, and the 
provincial government signaled dissatisfaction with the whole process when they tabled the 
Discussion Paper on an Accelerated Approach to Aboriginal Land Claims Settlement. The 
government of Newfoundland and Labrador described the process as “inefficient in its design” 
and recommended a more holistic approach that would both be timesaving and cheaper (RCAP 
vol3, 140). In June 1992, the federal government pulled out of negotiations after the province 
refused to agree to the cost sharing scheme to compensate the Inuit (Gorham 1993).  
With the federal side not involved and the province involved in their first land claim 
negotiation, there was little progress. Six years into the AIP negotiations, only one chapter had 
been initialed and there was only some progress on other matters (Alcantara 2008, 141). The 
discovery of a major deposit of nickel and cobalt in Voisey’s Bay, 30 kilometers south of Nain, 
58 
 
the biggest community in Nunatsiavut, prompted opposition from the Inuit and Innu, who had 
both laid claim to the area. The Innu protested the mining by setting up tents at the exploration 
site and burning mining equipment, while the Inuit did not endorse any confrontation, but 
opposed development before land claims were settled and urged the parties to discuss the 
stalemate (Canadian Press 1995a).  
The mineral find at Voisey’s Bay was welcome news to the province, as they had been 
struggling with unemployment for years after the collapse of the cod fishery in the early 1990s. 
In November 1995, Premier Clyde Wells announced that the province wanted to settle the 
claims before mining development, but there was still little substantive progress (Canadian 
Press 1995b). Ray Hawco, Newfoundland’s top official for native policy, agreed that the 
Voisey’s Bay project had changed the negotiating context and that the government would take 
a hard second look at the 1987 policy that excluded resource royalties (Gray 1996). During a 
meeting in the summer of 1996 between LIA president, William Barbour, Premier Tobin and 
federal Indian Affairs Minister Ron Irwin, the three parties decided to accelerate negotiations 
in response to LIA’s threat to seek legal action against the mining companies (Globe and Mail 
1996).  
In February 1997, the provincial government and the LIA both agreed to broaden the talks, 
with the Inuit being concerned that the government had taken the land around Voisey’s Bay off 
the table (Globe and Mail 1997a). While there was little progress on the land claims 
negotiations, Inco, which had acquired the mining rights at Voisey’s Bay, started construction 
of a temporary airstrip and road at the site of the find. The Inuit found this to be unacceptable 
as they wanted an Impact and Benefits Agreement (IBA) and resolution to their land claim 
agreement before development started (Lawton 1997). Without these measures in place, the 
Inuit and the Innu sought an injunction to halt the exploration work, which was at first 
dismissed, but was granted on appeals in August 1997 (MacAfee 1997).  
In October 1997, the parties met in Ottawa to get a solution. The injunction had the potential 
to prevent both governments from reaping the benefits from the nickel deposit, which was 
estimated to contain over 150 million tons of ore. To add weight to the meetings in Ottawa, 
Premier Tobin appointed two senior provincial servants, Harold Marshall and Bill Rowat, to 
attend with a mandate to resolve critical issues, in addition to the presence of INAC deputy 
minister Scott Serson (Alcantara 2013, 45). The proposed three-day session stretched to eleven 
days, and Premier Tobin flew in to monitor the sessions himself. On October 30, it was 
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announced that the three parties had signed a tentative agreement resolving the major issues of 
contention (the amount of land to be included, hunting and fishing rights, surface rights for 
resources, royalty sharing with the province, cash payment from the federal government, and 
self-government) (Globe and Mail 1997b) 
The agreement still had some hurdles to pass before ratification. Firstly, it had to be translated 
to Inuktitut and accepted by the LIA board of directors, something that was achieved within a 
week of the announcement (Hamilton 1997). Secondly, it took a year before the negotiators 
verbally agreed on an AIP, one that was nearly identical to the initial negotiators’ text from 
October 1997 (Southworth 1997). One of the more difficult issues during that year was the 
Labrador Inuit’s claim of harvesting rights within the Ungava offshore, something the Inuit 
were willing to drop for adequate compensation, but was very time consuming (Andersen 2017) 
With an initialed AIP, the agreement was first to be ratified by the Labrador Inuit. Following a 
75-day schedule of community meetings, LIA ratified the agreement when 80 percent of those 
who cast ballots voting in support of the AIP. This gave the LIA the mandate to enter into final 
agreement negotiations. However, even with the resounding ‘Yes’ in the referendum, the voter 
turnout was only 62 percent, which meant that only 49 percent of all eligible voters voted in 
favor21.  
Throughout 2000, the three parties engaged in land selection negotiations and consultation 
sessions with Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal groups throughout Labrador. These talks were 
delayed when Nain experienced a series of suicides in the early months of 2000 (MacDonald 
2000). On June 14 2000, the provincial government and the LIA reached agreement on a 
memorandum of understanding to protect lands for a proposed national park in the Torngat 
Mountains area (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2000). This was a significant 
step forwards in the negotiations, as the understanding between the provincial government and 
the LIA showed that both sides were committed to the resolution of the land claims and self-
government agreement. Along with Makivik dropping its legal action asserting overlapping 
rights for Nunavik Inuit in the Torngat Mountains area, most of the hurdles blocking ratification 
had finally been overcome (George 2001a). On June 25 2001, the three parties signed the AIP.  
                                                 
21 If this referendum had followed the same rules as the referendum for the final agreement, where the ballots 
not cast were counted as ‘no’-votes, it would have failed to ratify.  
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The AIP was quite extensive, and laid a solid foundation for the ensuing final agreement 
negotiations. The agreement included the following: 
Settlement area: 72,520 km² of land and 44,030 km² of ocean extending out to 12 miles. Within 
the settlement area there will be 15,800 km² owned by the Inuit as Labrador Inuit Lands, which 
will be categorized as Category I. The Inuit government will receive 50 percent of the first $2 
million of revenue and 5 percent of any additional provincial revenue from non-renewable 
resources in the settlement area and 25 percent in Labrador Inuit Lands.  
The agreement also included water and ocean management rights, a national parks and 
protected area chapter, preparation of a land use plan for the settlement area, authority to pass 
environmental assessment laws regulating Inuit lands, and exclusive rights to harvest wildlife 
and plants in Labrador Inuit Lands. In addition, the Inuit would have the right to impose taxes 
(although federal and provincial taxation laws will continue to apply). The agreement also laid 
out eligibility criteria, rules for ratification of the final agreement, guaranteed a capital transfer 
$140 million, and included a self-government chapter. 22 
The self-government chapter was quite extensive and established that the Inuit should prepare 
the Labrador Inuit Constitution, which would establish two levels of government: an Inuit 
Central government with jurisdiction over Inuit at a regional level, and five Inuit community 
governments. The Central Government would have the ability to make laws for Inuit in Inuit 
lands in matters such as culture and language, education, health and social services. In addition, 
the Central Government may provide services to Inuit in the province residing outside of Inuit 
lands. It may also establish an Inuit Court. The central government would just be open for Inuit 
citizens in terms of voting and holding office. The Community governments, however, would 
also be open for non-Inuit residents, with up to 25 percent of an Inuit Community Council 
available for non-Inuit residents.  
Issues that were still to be negotiated in the next phase included an implementation plan, land 
selection, the Inuit Government’s powers in relation to environmental protection and terms 
related to the Voisey’s Bay project. These negotiations proceeded relatively quickly, but not 
without any hurdles. There was pressure from the provincial government to include recognition 
of non-native hunters in the settlement area. Although the AIP did not restrict access for 
                                                 
22 Other chapters cover rights to fish for subsistence purposes throughout the settlement area and a guaranteed 
percentage of new or additional fishing licenses, and federal and provincial fiscal financing agreements to be 
negotiated every five years. 
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hunters, there were worries that an Inuit government would change that as soon as it assumed 
power. This was supported by the Mayor of Happy Valley-Goose Bay, who made it clear that 
the non-natives should be given more of a say in the process, and that they would not allow 
hunting and fishing rights to be bartered away by the provincial and federal governments for 
larger resource-harvesting issues (MacDonald 2002). LIA held the position that no other land 
claim agreement guaranteed rights for non-Aboriginal people, and neither would this one 
(Stacey, 2002).  
The Inuit were responsible for preparing and ratifying the Labrador Inuit Constitution before 
reaching a final agreement, as were the terms under the AIP. In March of 2001, the LIA’s 
executive and board members toured the villages to hold consultations with the communities. 
The constitution establishes the Nunatsiavut Government as the senior level of Inuit self-
government and the layout of the central government, community governments and the Inuit 
court. Ratification of the constitution required a 2/3 majority vote of the Labrador Inuit, which 
they acquired during the ratification vote April 17 2002, when 72 percent voted in favor.     
One of the major issues during the final phase of negotiations was land selection, involving 
determining what lands within the settlement area should become Category I lands, which are 
reserved exclusively for the use of the Inuit. The provincial government reacted very negatively 
to the Inuit land selection proposal, which was along much of the coastline of Labrador. In 
1994, the Inuit had been offered seven rectangular blocks of land by the province, and this new 
offer from the Inuit was deemed as unacceptable by then-premier Brian Tobin. The Inuit 
wanted ribbon shaped pieces of land along the coast, and through long negotiation sessions and 
persistence, the parties eventually ended up compromising on the land selection issue. The 
province agreed to the “ribbon” concept and gave up more of the coastline than they had 
initially wanted. The Inuit, on the other hand, had to accept receiving some land that they were 
not really interested in, and giving up some land that they originally wanted (Alcantara 2008, 
144).  
Another big issue was Voisey’s Bay. The AIP stated that a Voisey’s Bay chapter would be 
negotiated during the final agreement negotiations, and that the Inuit did not want development 
of the project before they had a land claims agreement. Several developments in this process 
changed this view. The multibillion-dollar mining project had for the last six years been buried 
under “the rubble of political, native and corporate clashes” (McNish and Cox 2002). In June 
2002, the province and Inco Ltd. reached an agreement to start operations on the mine. Days 
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later, 82 percent of the Inuit voted in favor of accepting the impacts and benefits agreement 
(IBA) with Inco, which included a $123 million compensation package and a commitment to 
fill between 25 and 40 percent of the jobs during the construction and development phase with 
Inuit workers (Nunatsiaq News 2002a). LIA, the provincial and federal governments signed 
the Voisey’s Bay interim measures agreement. The agreement provides that the Labrador Inuit 
agree not to exercise any Aboriginal rights, titles and interest that they may have in the Voisey’s 
Bay area in exchange for certain benefits. In addition to these three agreements, the province, 
the federal government, LIA and the Innu Nation signed an environmental management 
agreement (EMA) in July 2002. The LIA’s confidence in these agreements, as well as an 
informal understanding between the LIA president, the Premier and the minister of INAC that 
the land claims would be completed if the Voisey’s Bay project could commence, led them to 
agree to let the project move forward (Alcantara 2008, 145).  
The three parties initialed the final agreement in August 2003, next up was a ratification 
referendum by the Inuit. This was held on 26 May 2004, and 76,4 percent voted yes to 
ratification with a voter turnout of 86 percent. This number counts non-casted votes as no votes, 
meaning the percentage of support for those Inuit who voted was closer to 88 percent. The 
support in the five communities within the Inuit Lands were all quite high, ranging from 87,6 
percent to 97,9 percent. The level of support was significantly lower in Happy Valley-Goose 
Bay and North West River, which are located outside of the Inuit Settlement Area where Inuit 
only would have limited rights (Alcantara 2013, 49).  
The Labrador Metis Nation (LMN) quickly stated that they would take court action against the 
land claim agreement, charging that their own Inuit-based claim was at risk unless changes 
were made to the document. The Labrador Metis share family histories and genealogies with 
Kablunangajuit23 in Nunatsiavut, and in some cases the only difference between the 
Kablunangajuit and the Labrador Metis is that the Metis live to the south of Nunatsiavut. The 
final agreement stated that it was the final settlement of Aboriginal rights for Labrador Inuit, 
which seemed to preclude the acceptance of the Metis-Inuit claim. In the months leading up to 
the provincial ratification of the agreement, LMN threatened with “aggressive civil 
disobedience” if the agreement was ratified (Moore 2004). Despite these protests, 
Newfoundland and Labrador ratified the land claims agreement December 6, with a 40-to-1 
                                                 
23 Inuktitut term for those of mixed Inuit ancestry, and beneficiaries of the Labrador Inuit Land Claims 
Agreement if living within the settlement region.  
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vote in the House of Assembly. The only dissenting vote was that of Liberal Yvonne Jones, the 
only Metis member of the legislature (Bennett 2004). 
On 22 January 2005, federal, provincial and Inuit leaders signed the Labrador Inuit Land Claim 
Agreement, after 28 years of negotiations. It was given royal assent and became law six months 
later, as it passed through the Senate.  
This chapter has given a detailed description of the two negotiation processes and identified 
the key events. In the next chapter, I will examine these events and how they relate to the factors 






6. Explaining negotiation outcomes 
The previous chapter showed how the two negotiations in Nunavik and Nunatsiavut unfolded 
and described the key events leading up to the two different outcomes. In this chapter, I will 
explore how the theoretical framework that was presented in chapter three can explain these 
divergent outcomes by examining the causal process observations (CPOs) and how they relate 
to the separate factors thought to explain settlements or non-settlements. To refresh, CPOs are 
pieces of evidence or insight that provide information about context or mechanism. What 
follows is an examination of how the CPOs provide information about the factors thought to 
determine negotiation outcomes. I begin by examining the evidence to determine the presence 
or absence of compatible goals, internal cohesion, positive government perceptions and 
minimal use of confrontational tactics. I will further examine the role of institutional and 
contextual factors, such as the layering of the self-government policy and the development of 
a multilevel governance structure in Nunavik. Lastly, I will look at how the factors relating to 
the speed of negotiations were at play in the two cases.       
6.1 Factors affecting outcomes  
6.1.1 Compatibility of goals 
The compatibility of goals between the Aboriginal group and the two governments has a strong 
effect on whether a treaty is completed. If the Aboriginal group is willing to accept a final 
agreement that exists within the political and legal context of the Canadian constitutional order, 
there are likely to be compatible goals.  
To what degree were the goals of the different negotiating parties compatible, with respect to 
the purposes of a final agreement?  In Nunavik, there was a commitment from all parties to 
have a successful negotiation. Quebec’s commitment took several different forms: the proposal 
to do the negotiations in two phases came from the provincial government, for instance. The 
reasoning for the two-phase approach was quite straightforward: it would be quicker, 
foundationally sound and easier to accomplish. The amalgamation of Kativik Regional 
Government (KRG), Kativik School Board (KSB) and Nunavik Regional Board of Health and 
Social Services (NRBHSS) built upon something solid, and would be less time consuming. 
There were some fears that a change in government could have negative consequences for the 
negotiation process. This decision signaled a commitment from the provincial side to complete 
an agreement, even though it would be a less extensive agreement.  
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Despite differences, the parties were able to compromise and come to an agreement on most 
issues. The province was hesitant to include the word “gouvernement” in the French translation 
of the agreement, as they did not want to create a “third order of government” within the 
province. The Nunavik Party24, on the other hand, was eager for the new government to distance 
itself from the already existent Kativik Regional Government, which had the French name 
“Administration régionale Kativik”, and insisted on including “gouvernement” in the French 
name. At last, they settled on the compromise of “gouvernement régional du Nunavik”.  
There were some Inuit leaders at the time that would have preferred an ethnic government, 
instead of a public form of government. There were some discussion about it, but for the 
provincial government that was out of the question. Firstly, the Inuit already decided on a public 
government system when they signed the JBNQA, and it would take a lot to change that, and 
it would certainly be easier to base it on what already existed. Secondly, Quebec looked on this 
as devolution as was done in other countries and regions. The new government had to be 
homogenous with the Quebec government and the land was considered to be public land. In 
that context, it would not make sense to have an ethnic government. When it was clear that they 
would be negotiating public institutions, the three parties worked within this framework in 
order to reach an agreement. Members from all three parties have commented on the 
negotiations as being very much a collaborative process where they were working towards a 
common goal.  
Compatible goals were also clearly present in the negotiations for the Labrador Inuit Land 
Claims. The Labrador Inuit wanted an ethnic form of government, mainly to deliver goods and 
services to Inuit beneficiaries living outside of the settlement area, which is about half of the 
Labrador Inuit population. The federal government does prefer negotiating for a public 
government model, but once they recognized the inherent right to self-government, in principle, 
they also agreed that governments can be ethnic (Interview B 2017). Newfoundland and 
Labrador were vary of the fact that there lived non-Inuit in the communities and they needed 
the same treatment as the Inuit. The province needed some assurance that the provision of 
services was going to be equal between the Inuit and non-Inuit. In an attempt to satisfy both 
parties, they settled on Inuit-only voting in the election for seats at the regional Nunatsiavut 
Assembly, and non-Inuit voting rights in elections for councilors in the community 
governments. In the end, this solution satisfied all three parties.  
                                                 
24 The party representing Nunavik in the negotiations, composed of Makivik, KRG, KSB, and NRBHSS. 
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Another difficult issue during the final agreement negotiations was the wording of the finality 
and certainty provision (Alcantara 2008, 156). Historically, the federal government required 
Aboriginal signatories to cede, release and surrender their pre-existing undefined Aboriginal 
rights in exchange for a set of clearly defined rights as specified in a treaty. The Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) had, however, influenced Canada’s approach to 
certainty, and acknowledged that legal certainty was possible without the extinguishment of 
rights. The federal government had every desire to see some examples of success after the 
policy change (Interview B 2017).  The Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) was not willing to 
include the word “surrender” in the agreement, as it represented an extinguishment of pre-
existing Aboriginal rights and was a stand many Aboriginal groups took (AANDC 2010). The 
province wanted it included. The objective of the certainty and finality provision is to achieve 
clarity and certainty about the respective rights and obligations of the parties, and to obtain 
finality by securing clear title to land for economic and resource development (Eyford 2015, 
71).  
Provincial officials could benefit from the Inuit and federal officials knowledge about treaty 
negotiations and agreements signed by other Aboriginal groups (Alcantara 2013, 57). The two 
most recent completed comprehensive land claims agreements, the Nisga’a final agreement 
(2000) and the Tlicho final agreement (2003), achieved legal certainty without a surrender of 
rights, and showed that flexibility in the certainty provision was possible. Eventually, the 
province agreed to a “cede and release” provision. The Inuit kept their Aboriginal rights in the 
Inuit Lands (Category I), and ceded and released their rights in the Inuit Settlement Area and 
all lands that were previously claimed by the Inuit, but were not included in the agreement. 
According to Alcantara (2013), the province agreed to the “cede and release” provision because 
they felt that the level of certainty generated by the provision was sufficient for pursuing 
economic development in the area (58). Later studies on the evolution of the certainty provision 
have shown that even though the wording changed, they legally lead to the same, original 
outcome, namely extinguishment and legal certainty to facilitate economic development (see 
Alcantara 2009, Papillon 2008b, Eyford 2015). The causal process observations clearly indicate 
that there were compatible goals in both the negotiation processes. 
6.1.2 Tactics 
Government officials prefer to negotiate agreements with Aboriginal groups that shy away 
from the use of confrontational tactics such as media campaigns, protests and international 
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lobbying. Those groups that are committed to the negotiation process and do not have a history 
of confrontation will be more likely to work towards a final agreement with the two 
governments. The opposite will obviously be the case with Aboriginal groups that have a 
history of confrontation. The Inherent Right policy reinforces this notion, and states, “the 
Government is convinced that litigation should be a last resort” because it would be lengthy, 
costly and tend to foster conflict (Inherent Right Implementation). In Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia, the majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada ended in a resounding 
endorsement of negotiations over litigation with relation to settling Aboriginal claims.  
The Nunavik Inuit have a relatively long history of negotiation with the federal and provincial 
governments. Ever since the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA), Inuit leaders 
in Nunavik have been striving for self-government and have done this through negotiations and 
compromise. In 1983, when Premier René Lévesque promised self-government talks if the Inuit 
united themselves, the Inuit followed suit, put their differences aside and worked towards the 
common goal of self-government, within the negotiation framework. Trying to attain self-
government through any other measure than negotiation was not something they ever 
considered (Interview A 2017). Already being in the “system”, so to say, by previously having 
completed a land claims agreement and administrating three provincially funded institutions, 
does also show a commitment towards the negotiation route. The essence is that they were not 
starting from scratch by no stretch of the imagination, and any sort of self-government 
agreement would entail an amendment to the JBNQA, which requires the signatures of both 
levels of government.  
Another testament to the Nunavik Inuit’s commitment to the negotiation process is that before 
the self-government negotiations started, Makivik successfully laid claim to the offshore area 
comprising certain islands, water and ice of Hudson Bay, Hudson Strait and Ungava Bay in 
1993, which were all under the jurisdiction of Canada and Nunavut. During the buildup to the 
self-government discussions until 2006, the Nunavik Inuit were already negotiating a 
comprehensive land claim agreement with Canada and Nunavut. All of the people that were 
involved in the negotiations have talked of the positive atmosphere between the three parties, 
stating that they were working together like a team. A former Quebec government official, 
compared the Nunavik Inuit negotiations with the negotiations Quebec had with the Cree 
Nation, which was suing Quebec and Canada for $700 million. “While this battle with many 
high-level lawyers was happening with the Cree, the Inuit sat down with us to see what we 
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could build together. It was more of a partnership. I remember switching from one to the other, 
and it was like living two different lives” (Interview C 2017).  
This commitment towards negotiations over confrontation reflects the Inuit culture in general. 
Historically, Inuit culture had its own system of leadership and often sought consensus in 
decision making among those who were respected for their skills and abilities. Confrontation 
is seen as a last resort. John Amagoalik, Inuit politician and one of the instrumental figures in 
the campaign for the creation of Nunavut, argued that cooperation and negotiation were the 
only ways to solve problems between indigenous peoples and states. Moreover, after the Oka 
crisis, the armed standoff between a First Nation group and Canadian soldiers in 1990, the 
governments were much more willing to work with the Inuit (Alfred 2005, 122). Geographer 
Robert McPherson observed that “consensus building was the Inuit way [during Nunavut 
comprehensive land claims negotiations]” (2003, 140). Tom Molloy, federal negotiator during 
the Nisga’a land claim, also noted that the Inuit did not have to resort to litigation to have their 
rights acknowledged, unlike many other Aboriginal peoples (ibid, 270). The lead federal 
negotiator during the negotiations for the Nunavik government commented that the Inuit “go 
quite a bit on their reputation, which is that they are very pragmatic, adaptable, amenable and 
congenial – that is the “Inuit reputation” for both governments” (Budgell 2017). The lead 
negotiator for the LIA commented that the advice of the Inuit elders at the time was: negotiate, 
not litigate (Andersen 2017).  
When it came to the use of tactics, both Inuit groups were committed to the negotiation process, 
and hardly used any confrontational tactics. The Labrador Inuit did hold a minor protest at the 
Voisey’s Bay development site and turned to the courts to stop development at the site, but it 
did not create a significant impediment to the negotiations. Alcantara (2013) has argued that 
protests and litigation can work to jumpstart the negotiations, but only if it is used sparingly 
(61).  
6.1.3 Aboriginal group cohesion 
The cohesiveness of the Aboriginal community as it relates to the treaty process is another 
factor affecting whether an outcome is achieved. Aboriginal groups that suffer from intense 
political divisions that revolve around self-government issues will find it difficult to complete 
an agreement, as it can create instable negotiating teams and positions at the negotiating table. 
Community cohesion is also very important because a negotiated agreement must be ratified 
by the population through a referendum.  
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Since before the JBNQA was negotiated, the people of Nunavik had been divided in the 
question of self-government. Two competing visions of self-government emerged in the 1960s. 
A more radical grassroots organization which centered on the co-op movement called for the 
creation of an Inuit government. The other group’s vision was more pragmatic and asked only 
for some administrative autonomy. Of course, the more pragmatic approach won out when the 
JBNQA came along, but the division between the two groups remained. When they wanted to 
attain more comprehensive self-government provisions, this division needed to be united, as 
per Premier Lévesque’s wishes. As a result, the regional organizations25 formed a task force, 
called Ujjutuijiit, to consult the Inuit and propose a self-government plan. They tabled two 
different proposals: a working group on self-government to be composed of elective 
representatives and financed by a voluntary tax levied on businesses, institutions and 
individuals, and a committee constituted of representatives from the different Inuit 
organizations and funded by those organizations. Unable to choose, they held a referendum in 
1987, where the grassroots option with a working group of elected representatives narrowly 
won the vote (Mitchell 1996, 368).  
This created the Nunavik Constitutional Committee (NCC), where the proponents of the first 
option were chosen to implement the second option. This, seemingly, reunited the Inuit behind 
a common process (Rodon & Grey 2008, 6). The NCC drafted a constitution that was approved 
in a referendum in 1991, and were ready to start self-government negotiations until it took a 
political back seat to the question of Quebec sovereignty in the mid-1990s. In what capacity 
did this split continue to exist after those years? This is not an easy question to answer. There 
is a gap of 20 years from the referendum of the Inuit constitution to the referendum on the final 
agreement to create the Nunavik Regional Government (NRG). The constitution that was 
drafted and accepted by the Nunavik Inuit by a wide margin in 1991 did recommend the 
amalgamation of the regional institutions (KRG, KSB and NRBHSS) and for the establishment 
of a non-ethnic, territorially regional and centrally funded government.   
The biggest change from the draft constitution of 1991 and the final agreement of 2011, is the 
lack of any new jurisdictions to manage for the proposed Nunavik Assembly. In NCC’s draft 
constitution and the Nunavik Commission Report, the Nunavik Assembly would negotiate and 
manage new areas of jurisdiction in addition to those it would take over from the three regional 
institutions. The decision to first amalgamate, then negotiate new powers down the road is the 
                                                 




defining difference between a draft constitution that was accepted by the Nunavik population 
and a final agreement that was voted down. The reasons for the negative outcome is, of course, 
complex, but there seems to be two distinct camps working against the agreement. On the one 
hand, you have the people that felt that the agreement did not establish genuine self-government 
and represent enough of Inuit aspirations. On the other hand, there was a group that felt that the 
Inuit did not have the ability to manage an institution like the proposed NRG.  
The widespread opposition towards the agreement came as a surprise to all parties. The Inuit 
negotiators had for years provided the public with regular updates through community 
meetings, radio and by publishing quarterly newsletters. During the information tour of the 
final agreement, the opposition became clear, and clearer on social media during the two 
months from February to March leading up to the referendum. With respect to the displeasure 
of doing the negotiations in two phases, it is clear that there was a lot of mistrust directed 
towards the governments. The Nunavimmiut displayed little confidence that governments 
would follow up with a second phase and negotiate new powers to the NRG, as the final 
agreement did not provide any definite assurances of this. As discussed in the preceding 
chapter, this was done deliberately, since the agreement could not prelude the decision-making 
power of the new government. However, both the provincial and federal negotiator made it 
clear during the information tour that both governments had every intention to go through with 
the second phase (Rogers 2011c). 
Another issue during the period leading up to the referendum was the inability of the 
negotiators, especially the Inuit negotiators and the Nunavik Party, to refute statements about 
the agreement. Per referendum rules, the Nunavik Party was not allowed to set itself up as a 
‘yes’-group during the “Referendum Period” from March 18 to April 26. The federal and 
provincial side were not allowed to have social media involvement at the time. The three parties 
were completely unprepared to deal with the social media uproar that occurred after the final 
agreement was tabled. This was of great frustration to both the federal negotiator and the Inuit 
negotiators (Interview A 2017, Budgell 2017). They were not able to refute or make coherent 
responses to statements that might have been false or demonstrated a lack of understanding. 
This was particularly damaging as the Nunavimmiut were able to connect very effectively over 
social media, in ways that just years earlier would have been impossible.  
The information tour was not able to attract the young population to any significant degree 
(Rogers 2011a, Budgell 2017). This can be seen as problematic as 50 percent of the eligible 
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Inuit voters living in Nunavik were under the age of 35. There is no data available on voter 
demographics in either of the referendums, but it is safe to say that the land claims agreement 
in Nunatsiavut more effectively reached out to the population than was the case in Nunavik26. 
The negotiations in Nunavik met resistance from within before the parties could even reach a 
framework agreement. Kativik School Board (KSB) sought a more prominent role at the 
negotiation table and a bigger emphasis on education and language. The rift started already 
under the consultation phase with one of the Inuit representatives in the Nunavik Commission 
clashing with a provincial representative. The Inuk in question was the director general at KSB 
from 1983 to 1993. KSB’s position on the commission report from the outset was that it was a 
flawed non-consensus document, did not include KSB’s recommendations and did not take into 
concern education’s role in preserving the Inuit language. As KSB was pondering their options, 
they did not involve themselves in the negotiation process, failing to name potential negotiators 
or participate in the Advisory and Technical Support Committee. After the school board failed 
to put a stop to the negotiations through the court, they started to be more included in the 
process. However, even as a part of the Nunavik Party, they were not too enthused with the 
proposed self-government agreement, mirroring similar sentiments as those uttered leading up 
to the referendum, namely that the agreement as constituted did not establish genuine self-
government.  
Contrast this with the experiences of the Labrador Inuit, who came across as a more cohesive 
group. In terms of popular support for the agreement, the LIA held three referendums during 
the negotiation process. Two of them (AIP and Constitution) were directly connected to the 
ongoing negotiations and can be interpreted as popular support for the land claims agreement 
itself and the general willingness of the Inuit population to continue the negotiations. Several 
times during the negotiation process, the Labrador Inuit voiced their support for the agreement, 
while the Nunavimmiut did not have the opportunity, at least not in an organized way such as 
a referendum, leading the final agreement referendum to be the first, only and final opportunity 
for the population to have a meaningful say in the negotiation process27. Referendums are 
significant not only in substantive terms as a mechanism of change, but also for their symbolic 
role in “bringing together and hence declaring the voters to be – directly, equally and 
                                                 
26 The voter turnout in Nunatsiavut was 86 percent, compared to 54 percent in Nunavik. 
27 To reduce the possibility that future final agreements will be rejected, federal policy now requires that all 
Aboriginal groups ratify their AIP through referendums (Alcantara 2013, 16). 
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communally – a determining ‘self’” (Tierney 2012, 60). Referendums can engage the self-
awareness of citizens as a collective, which might otherwise lie dormant in other processes.   
Furthermore, the advent of social media, and especially Facebook, in the intervening years 
between the two agreements, certainly is a major difference between the two agreements. The 
Nunavimmiut had a platform where they were able to connect, share and discuss matters 
regarding the self-government agreement in a way that was not possible leading up to the 
referendum in Nunatsiavut. This is perhaps a factor that is not properly explored in Alcantara’s 
theoretical framework. Social media can be an instrument in sparking political expression and 
participation28. Social media can also be used to communicate misinformation as readily as it 
can be used to convey reliable information29. 
Within the confines of the negotiation room, the Nunavimmiut did not let the political 
infighting affect the progress of the negotiations in any significant degree. Although the 
minister of SAA called KSB’s legal action against Makivik “awkward”, the Inuit negotiators 
were able to keep it at a distance and worked on the agreement alongside the provincial and 
federal governments whilst the KSB was taking them to court.  
An Aboriginal group that suffers from severe social and economic distress may find it 
impossible to complete an agreement since it may prevent the group from focusing on 
negotiating and ratifying a final agreement. Both groups did suffer from substance abuse, 
unemployment and a high suicide rate. Between 2000 and 2011, 163 Nunavimmiut died by 
suicide, making it the second highest cause of death in the region, just behind cancer Rogers 
2016). The Labrador Inuit face similar difficulties, and saw a spate of suicides in 2000, when 
10 people committed suicide in a period of 10 months in the town of Nain, with a population 
1400. In spite of these difficulties, the negotiations were not hampered by it. Alcantara (2013) 
argues that leadership plays a role in how social and economic problems affect land claims 
negotiations (111). A leadership that is united on whether to negotiate a land claims or self-
government agreement and sees an agreement as the solution to community problems, will to 
a lesser degree let those problems derail the negotiations.  
Historically, the Nunavik Inuit leaders have agreed on the notion of self-government 
negotiations. However, they were divided on whether they should negotiate this exact self-
                                                 
28 See Joseph (2012) and de Zuniga, Molyneux and Zheng (2014). 
29 Misconceptions about the French translation of “Nunavik Regional Government” was widely shared on the 
Facebook group for instance (see Nunatsiaq News 2011, Nunavik 2011). 
73 
 
government agreement. Long-serving senator and founding president of the Makivik 
Corporation, Charlie Watt, commented that it was not genuine self-government and that they 
should scrap the deal (Toronto Star 2001; Travers 2000). In Puvirnituq, one of the three 
communities that refused to accept the JBNQA, the mayor was skeptical of the agreement, and 
did not see it as a genuine self-government, but merely as Quebec “rearranging the furniture” 
(George 1995). The same sentiment was reiterated when the Nunavik Commission presented 
their findings in the northern village: that it was not full autonomy if the agreement is based on 
shared jurisdiction with the provincial government (Blackduck 2001). Even Zebedee Nungak, 
former Makivik president and the person who rebooted the self-government talks in 1997, was 
overtly opposed to the agreement just before the referendum in 2011, citing the same worries 
as Watt and the mayor of Puvirnituq (Rogers 2011d). This divisiveness on the form of self-
government in Nunavik has been present since before the JBNQA. 
Contrast this with the experiences of the Labrador Inuit, who had a much more clear and 
consistent leadership, and relatively few internal problems, and a higher level of support for 
self-government throughout the negotiation process, evident through the different referendums 
that were held.  
6.1.4 Government perceptions 
How the provincial and federal governments perceive the Aboriginal groups does affect the 
outcome of the negotiations. Government perceptions directly affect its willingness to devolve 
powers to Aboriginal groups. They want to avoid the potential political backlash that may occur 
if responsibilities are given to a group that does not have the capacity to manage them. 
According to Alcantara (2013, 64), governments want to avoid international and domestic 
embarrassment when they negotiate with Aboriginal groups. Three government perceptions 
matter: the group’s capacity for financial accountability, its capacity for negotiations and self-
government, and the degree of acculturation in terms of its level of understanding of 
government processes and institutions.   
The Nunavik Inuit were held in a high esteem when it came to their record of financial 
accountability. They had extensive experience in administrating their own public institutions 
and managing government funding. The $90 million the Inuit got from the James Bay 
settlement had nearly doubled in value and Makivik was at the time running two airlines, an 
arctic foods company and a fuel service operation. The same was the case for the Labrador 
Inuit, who had a record of financial accountability leading up to the negotiations. According to 
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former LIA president, William Barbour, government officials remarked, during a trip to Nain, 
that LIA had the “cleanest books in all of Atlantic Canada” (Alcantara 2008, 165). This notion 
is reinforced by the fact that they have never fallen under third party management.  
The Nunavik Inuit also showed that they were capable negotiators and able to identify what 
they were looking for. Both the federal and provincial perception of capacity for self-
government was high, in part because of their history of managing public institutions since the 
implementation of the JBNQA (Interview C 2017, Budgell 2017). The decision to consult the 
people regarding what kind of government they wanted came from the Inuit, who were looking 
to the Nunavut Implementation Commission and the Greenland Home Rule Commission as a 
model, which demonstrated knowledge about the negotiation process and the importance of 
involving the people. The Nunavik Party came to the negotiating table prepared and skilled at 
negotiating with government officials. They were very aware of the implications of self-
government, and what it represented in terms of training elected people (Interview C 2017). 
Overall, the Nunavik Inuit demonstrated to the federal and provincial governments that they 
could deliver programs and services to their population quite effectively.  
The same was the case with the Labrador Inuit, who had taken control over several government 
services from the province during the 1980s. The LIA negotiated directly with the federal 
government to set up the Labrador Inuit Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program and operated a 
community health representative program. In 1989, the Labrador Inuit Health Commission, a 
subsidiary of the LIA, took over the administration of the Non-Insured Health Benefits 
Program, as one of only a handful of native groups (Baikie 1990). LIA administration of post-
secondary assistance funding has been equally successful (AANDC 2006, 230). In addition, 
the LIA has either alone or along with others sponsored seven other organizations which are 
involved in providing housing, economic development, legal assistance and cultural programs 
(Haysom 1992, 181). In addition, their land claim Our footprints are everywhere was lauded 
by the federal government “as a model for other claims submissions by native peoples in 
Canada” and detailed the Inuit’s use and occupation of the area, showing an understanding of 
the negotiation process (AANDC 1990). Overall, there were no real doubts regarding both 
groups capacity for self-government or financial accountability from either of the governments.  
Another government perception that the literature has pinpointed to have an effect on whether 
a group completes a land claims negotiation is the degree of acculturation of the Aboriginal 
community (see Nadasdy 2003; Alcantara 2013). In the context of tripartite land claims and 
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self-government negotiations, this refers to the group’s knowledge of Canadian institutions, 
processes and languages.  
Overall, the Labrador Inuit are more acculturated to Canadian society than the Nunavik Inuit, 
largely because of the early contact with Moravian missionaries. This becomes apparent if one 
looks at language. In Nunatsiavut, 99 percent of the Inuit population speak English and only 7 
percent speak Inuktitut most often at home. Contrast this with the Inuit in Nunavik, where 75 
percent of the Inuit population speak English, 94,6 percent speak Inuktitut most often at home, 
but only 23 percent speak French, the official language in Quebec. That most Nunavimmiut 
lean towards English as a second language puts them in a double minority position in Quebec, 
as indigenous people as well as English speakers. Although it might not make their lives any 
easier and creates a challenge in accessing and understanding what kind of services might be 
available to them, none of the government officials I have spoken to attributed any significance 
to this factor (Budgell 2017, Interview B 2017, Savoie 2017, Interview C 2017). A former 
government official, who wished to remain anonymous, assured that this is not an issue and 
that there is not “any indigenous group in Canada that isn’t acculturated enough” (Interview B 
2017).  
One federal government official did, however, point to the Nunavimmiut’s quite recent contact 
with the “outside world” as a factor when it came to ratifying the agreement, and that there 
were certain concepts that would have been difficult to understand. In several indigenous 
groups, the western concept of political autonomy is not well received or understood, which 
also can be observed in Nunavik (Hervé 2017b, 99).   
6.1.5 Institutional factors 
The evolution of Canada’s negotiation policy did affect both the case of Nunavik and 
Nunatsiavut. The layering of the negotiation policy in the period from 1973 to 1995, led to the 
two negotiations being quite different nature. When Canada invited Aboriginal groups that had 
not previously completed treaties with the Crown in 1973, devolution of powers such as 
jurisdiction over education, health care, policing, and the like, was not permitted. Over time, 
new rules were added to the policy and jurisdiction over new powers became available for 
Aboriginal groups, culminating in the Inherent Right to Self-government policy in 1995.  
A significant difference between the two cases is that the Nunavimmiut negotiated a stand-
alone self-government agreement, whilst the Labrador Inuit negotiated a joint land claims and 
self-government agreement. The layering of new rules regarding the inherent right of 
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Aboriginal self-government in the federal policy allowed the Labrador Inuit to include self-
government provisions in the land claim, while the Nunavik Inuit, who had already completed 
a land claims agreement, and thus had to negotiate two separate agreements in order to achieve 
what the Labrador Inuit did with one. The different scopes of the two agreements do play a role 
in governments’ urgency and incentives to complete an agreement. Development pressures on 
land, such as the Voisey’s Bay project, can accelerate land claims negotiations, but will not 
have the same effects in Nunavik as there already existed certainty of land ownership from the 
JBNQA.  
When it comes to ratifying a self-government agreement versus a land claims agreement, one 
can apply the same logic. A land claims agreement with self-government provisions is, by 
definition, more comprehensive than a self-government agreement. The progress an Aboriginal 
group makes by completing the former constitutes a bigger step forward, with a lot more to 
gain in terms of certainty, financial settlements, natural resources and other far-reaching 
jurisdictions, compared to the latter. In this respect, the Nunavimmiut were more willing to 
extend the status quo of regional administration in pursuit of a stronger self-government 
agreement.  
Another perspective involves a learning experience for the Inuit in Nunavik. Having already 
completed a land claims agreement, they knew of the significance and the finality of what an 
agreement with the two governments brings. The Nunavimmiut have often in the past referred 
to the government, either provincial or federal, as ataatak (father), implying a power 
relationship in which the Nunavimmiut has to agree to the requests of the government (Hervé 
2017, 101). Saying “no” to the government was seen as an inconvenience, but the acquisition 
of new knowledge and new experiences after the implementation of the JBNQA gave them 
“the authority to elevate themselves as an equal partner to the governments and to impose their 
opinion; to say “no”, and eventually, to refuse to follow” (ibid, 102). 
The JBNQA also introduced a quite unique government structure in Nunavik. The three public 
government structures that were created are functionally and administratively independent.30 
Although they are primarily responsible for overseeing the administration of provincially 
mandated policies, they have over time acquired powers to modify these policies to fit regional 
needs. The institutional complexity of Nunavik, with the existence of three firmly entrenched 
and regionally specific governance bodies alongside Makivik, a powerful economic 
                                                 
30 KRG, KSB and NHBSS. 
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development corporation and the primary political representative of the Nunavimmiut, provides 
an interesting context in which to negotiate a self-government agreement. The emergence of a 
complex multilevel governance system with several different actors in Nunavik gave rise to a 
strong regional school board. This setup allowed the school board to grow anxious about their 
new and different role in the proposed government structure, concerned about the lack of 
guarantees for the education budget, and to directly oppose the proposed self-government 
agreement. 
Contrast this with the situation in Nunatsiavut, which did not have the same complex 
institutional situation. The Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) was the only political and cultural 
organization in Nunatsiavut that represented the Inuit. The LIA and its subsidiaries did assume 
a quasi-governmental role by providing social services and advancing economic development 
in the region before the signing of the land claims agreement, but did not have to deal with 
direct opposition from a firmly entrenched governance body.  
6.2 Factors affecting speed 
There are certain factors that do not necessarily affect the outcome of the negotiations, but more 
the speed at which the negotiations are done and stand apart from the factors above. Of the four 
factors affecting speed that Alcantara (2013) identified in his framework, two of them 
(development pressures and competition of lands) are intrinsically linked to land claims, and 
thus irrelevant for the process in Nunavik, but will be discussed nonetheless as they did affect 
the speed of the negotiations in Nunatsiavut. The development of a professional trust 
relationship between Aboriginal and government negotiators allows the negotiating teams to 
make proposals outside of the formal negotiating setting with the knowledge that these 
proposals will not be used against them in the future. Furthermore, the appointment of an 
external negotiator to represent the government parties can also speed up the process, as third 
party negotiators have been found less constrained than government bureaucrats31. However, 
supportive governmental negotiators can have the same effect. 
6.2.1 Trust relationships 
The professional relationship between Aboriginal negotiators and their provincial and federal 
counterparts does affect the speed of the negotiations. All of the negotiators in Nunavik have 
acknowledged the respect and good faith of the parties during the negotiations. They were able 
                                                 
31 External negotiators do not have the same chain of command that bureaucrats do, and often have more direct 
access to high-ranking officials. 
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to trust both inside and outside the negotiation room. They worked together very closely and 
shared information, expertise and experience to draw up what they believed to be a very solid 
document. Building a trust relationship was also important in this particular scenario in terms 
of the second phase. The Nunavik Party was confident that the provincial and federal 
government would follow up with a second phase, even though they could not formally promise 
it.  
Another factor was the continuity of the negotiators: the Inuit team remained unchanged 
throughout the whole process, except for one person stepping down in order to continue as 
chairperson of the KRG. The federal team employed Donat Savoie as lead negotiator until his 
retirement in wake of the final agreement negotiations, when Richard Budgell took over. The 
provincial team changed more often, with three lead negotiators in total, but with Fernand Roy, 
the lead negotiator since 2005, who was a part of the team since before the Political Accord. 
The degree of knowledge the government negotiators had of the North, should not be 
overlooked. Donat Savoie and Fernand Roy both had extensive knowledge of the area and had 
both spent time living there. At the time of Savoie’s retirement, Makivik honored him at the 
annual general meeting as a longtime friend of the region.   
For the Labrador Inuit, there were some trust issues in the beginning of the process. Both the 
federal and provincial side changed their lead negotiator seven times in total, making it difficult 
to build the necessary trust relationships. After the federal government appointed Jim 
Mackenzie in 1996 and the provincial government appointed Bob Warren, who both stayed for 
the duration of the negotiations, it was easier to build a relationship. In fact, all the negotiators 
have spoken of the trust built between the negotiators after 1996 as an important factor for 
completing the agreement (Alcantara 2008, 170). Toby Andersen, lead negotiator for the Inuit, 
stated that Bob Warren had “a real eye for the Inuit and was an ally” (Andersen 2017). The 
negotiators knew that proposals coming from either side would be sincere and that each side 
would be open about their mandate and flexibility regarding those mandates.  
Trust relationships between the governments and the Aboriginal group were clearly present in 
both the case of Nunavik and Nunatsiavut. Within the negotiation room there was mutual 
respect between all parties and a willingness to work together. The amount of time this sped up 
the negotiations is difficult to assess, but one cannot attribute the lack of trust as a factor to the 
prolonged negotiation period.  
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6.2.2 Government and external negotiators  
The use of external negotiators that is not subject to the same hierarchical constraints as a 
governmental negotiator can speed up to the process. The appointment of Jim Mackenzie, a 
non-bureaucrat, as lead federal negotiator in the Labrador Inuit negotiations was effective in 
several respects. Firstly, he had the mandate to negotiate an agreement beyond the existing 
government policies. Secondly, he was not subject to the hierarchy that bureaucratic negotiators 
tend to face. This sped up the progress in the sense that the lead negotiator did not have to leave 
the negotiation room in order to clear items with their superiors.  
In the negotiations for the Nunavik self-government agreement, neither the provincial nor the 
federal government used an external negotiator. One might attribute this to the commitments 
and personalities of the governmental negotiators. Both Fernand Roy and Donat Savoie were 
very committed to getting a deal done, and open with the rest of the negotiators what their 
mandates were. According to one provincial observer, Roy really believed in the project and 
worked relentlessly for its completion (Interview C 2017). The same can be said for Savoie, 
who had great relations with the Nunavimmiut and worked effectively on behalf of Inuit 
concerns.  
These two factors affect the speed of the negotiations as opposed to the outcome because 
negotiators, whether they are external or governmental, are subject to higher ranks of command. 
If the political willingness is not present from the ministers, it does not matter whether the 
negotiators are committed to a deal. Conversely, if there exists willingness from the top to 
complete a deal, an agreement could be reached without the presence of negotiators who 
believe in the Aboriginal group.  
6.2.3 Competition for use of lands and development pressures 
The competition for use of lands was relatively non-existent in the case of the Labrador Inuit. 
The land claimed by the Labrador Inuit was mostly remote and Inuit-populated, and met little 
competition from other Aboriginal groups or non-Aboriginals. There was a minor disagreement 
about non-native hunting rights in Labrador Inuit Lands, which the province wanted to ensure. 
However, there was no precedent in any land claims agreement in Canada about ensuring, or 
even including, non-native rights, and the LIA did not want to set one either. As the final 
agreement did not restrict access for non-native hunters and they mostly lived outside of the 
settlement area, the proposal did not see much traction.  
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In terms of development pressure, the discovery of Voisey’s Bay was a significant factor that 
sped up the negotiations with the Labrador Inuit. Before the discovery, the negotiations were 
moving along slowly as there were no financial incentive to complete an agreement. After the 
discovery, the negotiations were fast-tracked and impact and benefits agreements were signed, 
in order to clear way for development.  
I have through process tracing identified the causal process observations (CPOs), examined 
how they mattered and then determined whether the two negotiations had compatible goals, 
internal group cohesion, minimal use of confrontational tactics and positive government 
perceptions of Aboriginal group. Additionally, I have identified certain CPOs that show how 
the complex institutional structure in Nunavik was a factor that negatively impacted the 
negotiation outcome in the region.  
The findings indicate that the different outcomes in Nunavik and Nunatsiavut can be explained 
by the lack of group cohesion in Nunavik. There had since before the signing of the James Bay 
Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) existed two competing visions of Inuit self-government 
in Nunavik. This division was still present when they voted on self-government in 2011, 
evidenced by the widespread questioning of the agreement on social media and by prominent 
leaders in the region. By contrast, in Nunatsiavut the population supported the negotiations 
throughout the process. The three different referendums during the negotiations not only 
showed the Labrador Inuit’s support for the agreement, but also included the population in a 
meaningful way, which was not the case in Nunavik. The leadership in Nunatsiavut was able 
to communicate and include the population in the decision-making process more effectively 
than the Nunavik leaders.  
Furthermore, the institutional legacy of the JBNQA, which created three firmly entrenched and 
regionally specific governance bodies in Nunavik, gave rise to a strong school board with a 
high degree of autonomy. Kativik School Board (KSB) opposed the self-government 
agreement from the beginning and was concerned with what their own role would be in the 
proposed amalgamated government structure. Consequently, they were critical towards the 
agreement throughout the negotiation process, even when they were a part of that process. 
Hence, due to the strong and autonomous government structures created by JBNQA, the self-
government agreement met widespread opposition. This was, however, not the case in 
Nunatsiavut, which was the only Inuit region that had not completed a land claims agreement. 
Therefore, there were not any existent government structures to oppose the agreement, enabling 
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the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) to negotiate with the belief that they had full support and 
ratify the agreement through referendum without much opposition.  
Moreover, the institutional layering of the federal government’s self-government policy meant 
that the two Aboriginal groups negotiated two very different agreements. The Nunavimmiut 
had less to gain by accepting the self-government agreement, seeing as they already had a form 
of government structure in place, and were therefore more willing to accept the status quo. The 
polar opposite was the case in Nunatsiavut, seeing as the agreement constituted a major step 
forward in terms of certainty, financial settlements and natural resources, in addition to self-
government.   
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7. Conclusions  
The main goal of this thesis was to explain why Nunavik and Nunatsiavut experienced different 
outcomes following extensive tripartite self-government negotiations. I considered the 
following research question:  
Why did Nunatsiavut succeed in attaining self-government following extensive tripartite 
negotiations while Nunavik did not, when they share similar basic features? 
 In order to answer the research question, it was first necessary to elaborate on the evolving 
institutional framework of Canada’s self-government policy, as the range of self-government 
powers available to Aboriginal groups has increased over time. I furthermore pointed out four 
factors (compatibility of goals, group cohesion, minimal use of confrontation tactics and 
government perceptions) thought to explain settlements and non-settlements in self-
government agreements. In addition to these factors, I argued for a greater appreciation for 
institutional and contextual factors, such as the layering of the self-government policy, and the 
emergence of multilevel governance structures in Inuit regions and their effect on political 
development. In the methods chapter, I introduced and justified the choice of multiple case 
study, and the use of process tracing, which consists of examining the diagnostic pieces of 
evidence that can contribute to either support or overturn explanatory hypotheses. The research 
question was explored and analyzed through primary and secondary source data material.  
Through careful description of the central steps in the two processes, I was able to identify if 
the different factors identified in chapter three were present in the two cases. The findings 
indicate that the different outcomes in Nunavik and Nunatsiavut can be explained by several 
factors. Firstly, there was a lack of group cohesion in Nunavik, which has been present since 
the signing of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA), and evidenced by the 
widespread questioning of the agreement by prominent leaders in the region and on social 
media. In Nunatsiavut, the population was to a bigger degree involved in the decision-making 
process through three different referendums.  
Moreover, a major difference between the two cases is the institutional context. In Nunavik, 
the JBNQA created three firmly entrenched governance bodies, who had operated quite 
autonomously for 30 years. One of those, Kativik School Board (KSB), opposed the proposed 
self-government agreement, as it was concerned about the future role of the school board in an 
amalgamated government structure. In Nunatsiavut, there did not exist any government 
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structures to oppose the agreement, as the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) was the only 
political actor in the region.  
Furthermore, the layering of the federal government’s self-government policy, with the 
introduction of new rules over time and an increased willingness to devolve a broader range of 
self-government powers to Aboriginal groups, meant that the two agreements negotiated were 
quite different in nature. As the Nunavimmiut already had completed a land claims agreement 
in 1975, when the range of self-government arrangements available were limited, and had a 
form of governance structure in place, they negotiated a stand-alone self-government 
agreement, and had less to gain by ratifying the agreement. By contrast, the Nunatsiavut deal 
was a joint land claims and self-government agreement and was more comprehensive, as it 
involved a broader range of powers, including land rights and financial settlements, and thus 
constituted a bigger change from the status quo.  
7.1 Implications of the study  
The implications of my study are manifold. First and foremost, it highlights the importance of 
Aboriginal group cohesion in relation to achieving a self-government agreement. Even if an 
Aboriginal group minimizes the use of confrontational tactics, is positively perceived by the 
governments and is willing to accept an agreement within the existing political context, these 
factors can remain insignificant if they do not attain internal cohesion. In addition, this thesis 
has highlighted the role social media can play in reinforcing internal division as it relates to 
self-government agreements.  
Another contribution this thesis makes is the need for a greater emphasis on institutional and 
contextual factors as it relates to Aboriginal self-government. When it comes to negotiating 
self-government agreements, it matters whether the Aboriginal group has completed a land 
claims agreement in the past for two main reasons. Firstly, land claims agreements typically 
creates particular institutional structures, which can affect the outcome of self-government 
negotiations, as was the case in Nunavik, where one of the institutions created by a land claims 
agreement actively opposed the self-government negotiations. Secondly, the completion of a 
land claims agreement in the past, leads the ensuing self-government negotiations to be less 
comprehensive in nature, and therefore the Aboriginal group has less to gain by completing the 
agreement.  
Any study on the field of Aboriginal politics in general, and self-government agreements in 
particular is valuable. The amount of studies conducted in this field is limited. This thesis 
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contributes to this field, and thus adds insight to how one can understand variations in 
negotiation outcomes. With the amount of self-government agreements thought to rise in the 
future, further knowledge about the processes and factors that facilitate a positive outcome is 
in itself valuable.  
7.2 Limitations and further research 
There are certain limits to my study. The most obvious is the problem of inference. I can only 
explain with any certainty the self-government negotiation outcomes for the Inuit in 
Nunatsiavut and Nunavik. Additional cases could possibly have strengthened the findings of 
thesis and allow for a greater generalizability. As I have conducted a small-N study, it is limited 
because it only considers two cases, thus the findings may not be representative of other cases. 
A second limitation is that I cannot state with any precision the strength of each of the 
explanatory factors. This is a limitation of case studies in general, as they can only make 
tentative conclusions on how much gradations of a particular variable affect the outcome. Case 
studies remain much stronger at asserting whether and how a variable mattered than asserting 
how much it mattered (George and Bennett 2005, 22). As such, the most that this thesis can do 
is to identify those factors that mattered and explain how they mattered in the two cases.  
With the amount of completed land claims and self-government agreements expected to rise in 
the coming years, this area is ripe for future research. An interesting case is the Inuit in the 
Inuvialuit Settlement Region in the Northwest Territories, as they have a similar institutional 
structure as Nunavik, and would allow for a better understanding of how institutional and 
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List of interviews conducted during fieldwork in June 2017, Canada 
Name Role Duration 
Toby Andersen Lead negotiator for the LIA 1h 12 min 
Donat Savoie Lead federal negotiator for 
the Nunavik Inuit file 
1h 14 min 
Richard Budgell Lead federal negotiator for 
the Nunavik Inuit file  
57 min 
Interview A Representative for the 
Nunavik Party 
24 min 
Interview B Representative for the 
federal government 
57 min 
Interview C Representative for the 
Quebec government 






Could you please tell me a little about how the negotiation process unfolded?  
Compatibility of goals: 
1. To what extent did you perceive the different negotiating parties to have compatible 
goals?  
a. What kinds of issues was the root of disagreement?  
b. How widely did the interests diverge?  
2. Was there a strong commitment to see the negotiations through from all parties?  
3. Were the negotiating parties open to alternative suggestions regarding what to include 
and not include in the agreement?  
Tactics:  
1. Was there ever any talk about pursuing self-government through other measures than 
negotiation, such as protest, litigation or media campaigns?  
2. Were there anyone who was opposed to the “negotiation route”?  
Aboriginal group cohesion 
1. Did domestic problems or internal conflicts ever hinder the negotiation progress?  
2. Did the Inuit community support the process throughout?  
3. Was the community informed about the state of negotiations throughout the process? 
4. Community involvement? 
5. Did the community voice any concern about the agreement before the final agreement 
was revealed? 
Government perceptions (specific for government employees) 
1. How was the Inuit perceived in terms of:  
2. Their capacity for financial accountability 
3. Was there ever any government audits? 
4. Their capacity for negotiations and self-government? 
5. Familiarity with Canadian languages and political processes 




1. Did the different negotiating parties develop a professional trust relationship? 
2. Was it possible for negotiators to propose ideas outside the formal negotiating process 
(without fear of having this used against them in future sessions)? 
3. Was there a continuity regarding negotiators involved? At which rate did negotiators 
from all sides of the table change?  
4. Were the different negotiators committed to seeing the agreement finalized? 
